Mobile Termination Carrier Selection

  • Jörn Kruse
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


Adopting the proposal to introduce “Mobile Termination Carrier Selection” (MTCS) would turn mobile termination into a competitive market. Predominantly, four parallel GSM networks offer coverage in a specific area and, after minor software changes to the GSM-standard, would be able to deliver the termination service to any mobile device (for all F2M and M2M calls). Thus, the mobile termination service would be supplied competitively. The demand side decisions of selecting the terminating networks would be made by either the calling parties themselves (i.e. MTCS at the retail level, call-by-call or preselection) or by the originating networks (i.e. MTCS at the wholesale level). Several arguments, including transaction cost economies, suggest that MTCS at the wholesale level would be most likely to prevail in the market. Efficient prices could be expected as a result of competition. Introducing MTCS would dispense of any need for mobile termination rate regulation.


Mobile Network Mobile Operator Signaling Traffic Mobile Telephony Termination Service 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jörn Kruse

There are no affiliations available

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