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Major Potential Benefits of CSR Engagement

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

Much has been written on the advantages good CSR policy would create in practice and on the potential it might offer for doing better financially. Such speculations include assumptions, or rather speculations, 3rd world governments would soon require companies for future bids to have CSR policies in place, and consumers would sooner or later abandon any company which does not engage in CSR. However, the following analysis mentions no speculative or wishful-thinking advantages of CSR, but on the contrary only those that have withstood empirical analyses. Such proven benefits good CSR can bring include the achievement of competitive advantage, better reaching market segments like ethical consumers and socially responsible investors, and enhanced opportunities for strategic alliances or other partnerships as major business opportunities for corporations with external constituencies, and, from an internal point of view, enhancement of labour relations and employee commitment, and the achievement of overall better financial and strategic results.

Keywords

Social Responsibility Fair Trade Organisational Commitment Social Enterprise Ethical Climate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2008

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