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Concrete CSR Measures: What can a Firm do?

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

Demands for private firms’ assumption of greater responsibilities toward society is not new, nor surprising, as the preceding historical and theoretical part has elaborated. Furthermore, business representatives try hard to excel each other in the CSRs they claim to take on — allegations that are frequently disqualified as PR fuzz. Therefore, a closer look at what can be done by corporations, besides mere CSR rhetoric, is useful:

Keywords

Unethical Conduct Corporate Philanthropy Corporate Code Corporate Donation Stakeholder Relation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2008

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