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Abstract

As many reasons as there are for the increased inclusion of social and environmental concerns in corporate agendas, what CSR means as a concept, and, as a second step, what should be its scope, are necessary definitions when grossly having decided that there are legitimate claims to be brought towards corporations by society at large.

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(2008). CSR Conceptualisation. In: Corporate Social Responsibility as an International Strategy. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2024-9_4

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