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Abstract

As many reasons as there are for the increased inclusion of social and environmental concerns in corporate agendas, what CSR means as a concept, and, as a second step, what should be its scope, are necessary definitions when grossly having decided that there are legitimate claims to be brought towards corporations by society at large.

Keywords

Corporate Social Responsibility Corporate Governance Stakeholder Theory Corporate Social Performance Corporate Citizenship 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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