Using data from an unbalanced panel of Chinese listed firms for the period 1996 to 2006, this study examines the frequency, causes and consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership.


Investor Protection Corporate Control Sales Revenue Share Structure Chinese Listed Firm 


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  1. 172.
    For instance, Bethel et al. (1998, p. 631) find that activist investors in the US typically target poorly performing firms and Köke (2004, p. 68) reports that German listed firms making earnings losses are more likely to experience a change in control.Google Scholar
  2. 173.
    Remarkable to note that the recently completed National People’s Congress in March this year enacted the first law to protect private property explicitly. See the East Asia and Pacific Update of the World Bank (2007, pp. 12–14 and 39) for more details.Google Scholar
  3. 174.
    See Green and Liu (2005, pp. 138–141). The authors provide case-study evidence on corruption in the organization and pricing of control transfers in China.Google Scholar
  4. 175.
    Brockman and Chung (2003, p. 935) posit that strong investor protection reduces the liquidity costs associated with asymmetric information.Google Scholar
  5. 176.
    Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002, pp. 5 and 19) develop a market equilibrium model of corporate finance in the environment of weak investor protection. Their model predicts that firms are more valuable, ownership concentration is lower and stock markets are more developed in countries with better protection of shareholders.Google Scholar

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