Abstract
Using data from an unbalanced panel of Chinese listed firms for the period 1996 to 2006, this study examines the frequency, causes and consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership.
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References
For instance, Bethel et al. (1998, p. 631) find that activist investors in the US typically target poorly performing firms and Köke (2004, p. 68) reports that German listed firms making earnings losses are more likely to experience a change in control.
Remarkable to note that the recently completed National People’s Congress in March this year enacted the first law to protect private property explicitly. See the East Asia and Pacific Update of the World Bank (2007, pp. 12–14 and 39) for more details.
See Green and Liu (2005, pp. 138–141). The authors provide case-study evidence on corruption in the organization and pricing of control transfers in China.
Brockman and Chung (2003, p. 935) posit that strong investor protection reduces the liquidity costs associated with asymmetric information.
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002, pp. 5 and 19) develop a market equilibrium model of corporate finance in the environment of weak investor protection. Their model predicts that firms are more valuable, ownership concentration is lower and stock markets are more developed in countries with better protection of shareholders.
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© 2008 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg
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(2008). Conclusion. In: Corporate Control and Enterprise Reform in China. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1_6
Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-2019-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-2020-1
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