Consequences of changes in ultimate share ownership

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


The results so far indicate that changes in control are most likely to occur in poorly performing firms — firms that offer the greatest opportunities for value improvement. If changes in control increase firm efficiency, changes in corporate control should be followed by corporate restructuring and ultimately lead to improvements in firm performance. To analyze the consequences of control changes, a univariate and a multivariate analysis are applied. The aim is to test H.5, as outlined in section 2.3.


Firm Performance State Transfer Sales Revenue Fixed Asset Control Change 
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  1. 156.
    Köke (2004, pp. 71–73) uses a similar methodology.Google Scholar
  2. 158.
    The following section is based on Greene (2003, pp. 307–334), and Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 763–768).Google Scholar
  3. 159.
    See Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 764–765) for a illustration of the bias present in standard panel estimators when a lagged dependent variable is included as one of the right-hand side regressors.Google Scholar
  4. 160.
    See Arellano and Bond (1991, p. 279); Wooldridge (2002, pp. 421–436) provides a general introduction to GMM estimation and Greene (2003, pp. 303–307) illustrates instrumental variables estimation in the context of the random effects model.Google Scholar
  5. 162.
    See Arellano and Bond (1991, pp. 281–283) for a discussion of these points and a description of the test statistics to deal with the validity of these assumptions.Google Scholar
  6. 163.
    See Bond (2002, pp. 146–148) and Greene (2003, pp. 309–311) for the deviation of the instrument matrix.Google Scholar
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    The empirical design is closely related to the methodology used in Elsas (2007, pp. 19–20).Google Scholar
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    See Demsetz and Lehn (1985, pp. 1159–1169).Google Scholar
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    See McNeil et al. (2004, p. 77) or Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004, p. 26) for a similar approach.Google Scholar
  10. 168.
    See Arellano and Bond (1991, pp. 291 and 293) and Bond (2002, p. 147). The reason for not reporting the Sargan-test in the one-step case with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors is that only in the case of a homoscedastic error term does the Sargan test have an asymptotic chi-squared distribution. In fact, Arellano and Bond (1991, p. 291) found evidence that the one-step Sargan-test over-rejects in the presence of heteroscedasticity.Google Scholar
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    See Wooldridge (2002, pp. 101–104) for an illustration of the “weak instruments” problem.Google Scholar
  12. 170.
    The following robustness tests are based on the description in Elsas (2007, p. 37).Google Scholar

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© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2008

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