Skip to main content

Data, concept of control, and summary statistics on changes in control

  • Chapter
  • 416 Accesses

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

Abstract

This study examines the frequency, causes and consequences of control changes using a sample of Chinese listed firms for the years 1996 to 2006. To identify changes in control, a concept of control that is based on ultimate share ownership is applied. This is significant because given the trading restrictions of different share classes and the historical relationship between listed and unlisted parent companies Chinese listed firms are in their majority ultimately controlled by local governments through pyramids or cross-ownership structures. This makes changes in direct ownership less meaningful.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Kato and Long (2006, p. 803) also use the ultimate controller classification of SinoFin in their study.

    Google Scholar 

  2. To the best of my knowledge, the classification of the ultimate controller by SinoFin is the most comprehensive database on ultimate control in Chinese listed firms. WIND’s database on ultimate control only ranges from 2004 to 2006. Liu and Sun (2005) trace the chain of control for 1,105 listed firms and calculate the percentage shareholdings of their ultimate controllers. However, their information stops in 2001 and is not yet publicly available.

    Google Scholar 

  3. See also Green and Liu (2005, pp. 133–134) and Cai and Chen (2004, p. 69).

    Google Scholar 

  4. Regardless of the price paid in the transaction, Barclay and Holderness (1989 and 1991) report that block transfers in the US are accompanied by positive cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date of these trades. Wang and Zhang (2004, p. 9) examine the stock price reactions after 587 negotiated block transfers in the SHSE and SZSE for the 1996 to 2000 period. They generally confirm that announcement dates of block trades are associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns.

    Google Scholar 

  5. See Green and Liu (2005, p. 134).

    Google Scholar 

  6. See Huang and Xu (2005, p. 23)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

(2008). Data, concept of control, and summary statistics on changes in control. In: Corporate Control and Enterprise Reform in China. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2020-1_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics