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Empirical analyses of individual retirement-specific FPB

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

This chapter describes the findings of the consumer retirement survey on individual FPB and so represents the core of the empirical analysis. In the first sub-chapter, the different investor groups with a higher or a lower risk capability than the average investor are pooled into homogenous investor types, based on similar socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics. These investor types show statistically distinct profiles, contain a sufficiently high number of individuals and so avoid an atomization of results. They are first characterized with regard to their socio-demographic and socio-economic attributes and then used as vehicles for the further empirical analyses. The FP perspectives of these investor types are described in sub-chapter 6.2. In sub-chapter 6.3, the effective FP actions are analyzed and compared to the principles for FP actions, set-up in the normative part of this study. Sub-chapter 6.4 then introduces a simulation to determine the existence of a retirement gap and the resultant required saving rate for the individual investor types. Furthermore, it discusses different scenarios as to when the financial assets of an individual are ebbing out or which levers individuals can pull to improve the outlook of their financial situation in retirement.

Keywords

Mutual Fund Saving Rate Financial Planning Financial Wealth State Pension 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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