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Capabilities for coevolutionary contingency

Part of the Contributions to Management Science book series (MANAGEMENT SC.)

Abstract

As elaborated in the previous chapter, the convergence phenomenon implies changing characteristics on innovation trajectories, both on industry and firm-level. In response to these temporal dynamics, the development and measurement of managerial approaches needs to take place under the evolutionary premise. Whereas the previous chapter primarily focused on the perspective of economic selection, i.e., the evolutionary perspective, which is mainly characterized by innovation dynamics, and exogeneous effects, this chapter will further emphasize on firm-level activities, i.e., search (defition 1). Based on the previously identified challenges related to respective phases and competitive constellations within the convergence process, this chapter will identify inherent firm-level capabilities for managing the dynamics of convergence. These capabilities are based on analyzing how firms from previously introduced case set responded to their respective challenges and changing conditions. Based on a classification of these capabilities, it is further attempted to develop guidelines for managing innovation through evolutionary convergence cycles, which serve as a basis for an induced framework for capability development.

Keywords

Business Model Path Dependency Growth Path Dynamic Capability Convergence Process 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. 1.
    Kauffman (1993) argues that all evolution is really coevolution: “The true and stunning success of biology reflects the fact that organisms do not merely evolve, they coevolve both with other organisms and with a changing abiotic environment.” (Kauffman, 1993, p. 237)Google Scholar
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© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2008

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