Framework for banking sector liberalization

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


The previous two sections have dealt with the main elements of transformation studies and the financial liberalization hypothesis. This section attempts to integrate these two approaches into a framework for the liberalization of the banking sector.


Interest Rate Monetary Policy Banking System Banking Sector Market Failure 


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