Management of transformation processes

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


Transformation studies attempt to explain the trigger, process and results of long-run systemic changes.1 When the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) started in 1989, only limited guidance existed on how to manage the transition from a command to a market economy.2 Since then, numerous and often conflicting policy recommendations have been given on how to best manage such transformations. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to evaluate the validity of these recommendations and assess the historical experience of the transition countries.


Transformation Process Banking Sector Transition Country Reform Process Shock Therapy 
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  1. 1.
    There is still some disagreement in the literature whether a general “transformation theory” exists. Because of the controversy, the rather general term “transformation studies” is used in this thesis to refer to a set of hypotheses describing the process of transition from a state-directed system to a market-based one. For a discussion see for example Pham-Phuong (2003a), Schulders (1998) and Solarz (1998).Google Scholar
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