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Deconstruction and the ‘(N)either/(N)or’

Abstract

The work of Derrida is often associated with and discussed in the realm of postmodern philosophy. To understand the broader context of Derrida’s philosophical thinking, we need to examine the discourse around postmodern philosophy (section 4.1.1). Since most applications of postmodern philosophy refer to organization theory, yet not to strategic management, we review the existing literature (section 4.1.2), since these writings have an influence on the implications of a deconstructive analysis of strategy research. Based on these remarks we develop an in-depth understanding of Derrida’s notion of deconstruction and its relevance for the social sciences (section 4.2). Because deconstruction has been applied to questions of organization theory, but not strategic management, we look at and classify the existing literature (section 4.3), as these writings have an impact on our own deconstructions in chapter six. Finally, to prepare the ground for an application of Derrida’s thinking to strategy research, we define strategic management as a ‘deconstructible text’ (section 4.4).

Keywords

Strategic Management Organization Theory Dominant Logic Grand Narrative Ganization Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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