This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
In contrast to representative models of monopolistic competition, locational models assume that consumers have preferences for products which are close to them either spatially or with respect to certain product characteristics. See section 3.3.4 for the application of such a locational model to insurance intermediaries. For a general overview see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) and Carlton and Perloff (2005, 200–243).
The formal analysis follows Neumann (1994, 198–203).
For models that analyze the welfare implications of monopolistic competition see, for example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or Hart (1985).
The formal analysis follows Neuberger (1998, 166–171) and Neuberger and Lehmann (1998) who used this approach to analyze direct banking as a new distribution channel for banks.
For a formal analysis see Neuberger and Lehmann (1998).
For the formal analysis see also Carlton and Perloff (2005, 452–470) and Stiglitz (1989a).
Gravelle (1991) takes into account direct marketing by insurance companies as well as collusion among insurers to control intermediaries’ commission.
This, however, requires that liability rules exist which impose on intermediaries legal liability if they violate certain duties. See Spence (1977).
For the working of service guarantees as signaling instruments to evaluate the quality of service firms, see Erevelles (1993); Kashyap (2001); Ostrom and Iacobucci (1998); Kumar, Kalwani and Dada (1997); Hart, Schlesinger and Maher (1992); Shimp and Bearden (1982); Wirtz, Kum and Lee (2000).
According to Carlton and Perloff (2005, 448) a standard is “a metric scale for evaluating the quality of a particular product”, and certification is “a report that a particular product has been found to meet or exceed a given level on a standard.”
While informational advertising provides information about a product’s characteristics, persuasive advertising aims to shift consumers’ tastes, see Carlton and Perloff (2005, 476–477).
Traditional theory explains vertical integration as resulting from market imperfections like market power, free riding, uncertainty, or economies of scale. Transaction costs economics stresses asset specificity, complexity, and uncertainty, while agency theory emphasizes information asymmetries, which are accompanied by adverse selection and moral hazard behavior. See Carlton and Perloff (2005, 395–438); Crocker (1983); Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987; 1994); Joskow (2005); Motta (2004, 302–410); Spulber (1999, 289–318); Williamson (1985; 1996).
See Gravelle (1992) for a comparison of the incentives set when intermediaries are compensated either by commissions or fees.
This avoids technical problems of the pure Hotelling model like the nonexistence of an equilibrium, see Salop (1979, 142).
For the optimal values for the kinked equilibrium and the necessary conditions for a zero profit equilibrium, see Salop (1979, 148).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2007). Competition between Insurance Intermediaries. In: Insurance Intermediation. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1940-3_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1940-3_3
Publisher Name: Physica-Verlag HD
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1939-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-1940-3
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)