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References
Rose (1999) is based on Hey (1981).
For a formal analysis, see Rose (1999, 248–249).
In some cases this can be done only numerically depending on the functions involved. For further details, see Rose (1999, 250–251).
For a more formal treatment, see Rose (1999, 115–120).
In contrast to the usually applied models of Bertrand price competition where fixed costs are zero and only positive marginal costs exist, in this model fixed costs for acquiring information are positive, whereas marginal costs for copying and disseminating information are zero. For more details, see Rose (1999, 142, fn.692).
But see Rose (1999, 156–160).
See Gravelle (1991; 1992; 1993) and section 3.3.1 for more details.
In case of a fixed-quality-level strategy, first both intermediaries fix their quality levels with Y I1 ≠Y I2 , then intermediary I1 decides on his optimal marketing efforts O I1 . Intermediary I2 takes them into account when choosing his optimal efforts O I2 . In the same way, the optimal values are determined when both intermediaries follow a quality-optimizing strategy. See Rose (1999, 146–147).
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(2007). An Economic Explanation of Insurance Intermediation. In: Insurance Intermediation. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1940-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1940-3_2
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