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References
See Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Kamerschen [1968], Leech/Leahy [1991], McConnell/-Servaes [1990], McEachern/Romeo [1978], Mørck et al. [1988], and Palmer [1973b].
See Holderness et al. [1999, p. 438] and Mathiesen [2002, pp. 87–88].
See Claessens et al. [2000, p. 92], Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 366], and La Porta et al. [1999, pp. 23–25].
See Bertrand/Mullainathan [2001, p. 478] and La Porta et al. [1999, pp. 23–25].
See Bertrand/Mullainathan [2001, p. 478], Beyer [1996, p. 84], and Grant/-Kirchmaier [2005, p. 66].
See Beyer [1996, pp. 82–83], Claessens et al. [2000, p. 91], Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 366], and La Porta et al. [1999, p. 10].
See Becht [1999, p. 1073], Claessens et al. [2000, p. 91], Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 366], Franks/Mayer [2001, p. 961], and La Porta et al. [1999, pp. 23–25].
See Becht [1999, p. 1073] and Faccio/Lang [2002, pp. 391–393]. This will be shown in detail in Chapter 3.
See Becht [1999, p. 1073], Claessens et al. [2000, p. 91], Edwards/Weichenrieder [1999, p. 2], Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 372], and Franks/Mayer [2001, p. 961]. For the special studies on dual-class equity see Bebchuk et al. [2000], Bergström/Rydqvist [1990b], DeAngelo/DeAngelo [1985], Grant/Kirchmaier [2005], Hanson/Song [1995], and Jarrell/Poulsen [1988].
See Faccio/Lang [2002, p. 372], Franks/Mayer [2001, p. 950], and La Porta et al. [1999, pp. 9–12].
See Edwards/Weichenrieder [1999, pp. 12–13].
See Mehran [1995] for an assessment of stock options, control and cash flow rights.
See Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Agrawal/Mandelker [1990], Agrawal/Nagarajan [1990], Cho [1998], Holderness et al. [1999], Jarrell/Poulsen [1987], and McConnell/Servaes [1990].
See McEachern/Romeo [1978, p. 354].
See Radice [1971] and Sorensen [1974], who define OC for share size below 5% and oc for a share bigger than 15% and 20% respectively.
See Boudreaux [1973], Elliott [1972], and Monsen et al. [1968]. The limit for MC is located at 5%.
Cubbin/Leech’s measure is calculated as \( P^* = Z_\alpha * \sqrt {\Pi \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^{\rm N} {P_i^2 } } \) where P* is the share size needed for control, П the probability of exercising the vote, Pi the fraction of share hold by the individual i, N the number of shareholder excluding the largest. Zα is the critical value resulting of the standardization of Z = Y/σy and Y = Σ Ni=1 Xi where Xi is the sum votes by the shareholder i in favor of the largest shareholder (contra votes counting negative). See Cubbin/Leech [1983, pp. 357–358].
See Jensen [1986] and Jensen/Meckling [1976].
Similar, Steer/Cable [1978] changed the threshold to 3% with management representation and 15% without.
For the full description of the groups see Nyman/Silberstan [1978, p. 85].
See Cubbin/Leech [1986], Denis/Denis [1994], and Steer/Cable [1978].
Slovin/ Sushka [1993] performed an akin and more detailed study of this scenario.
See Demsetz/Lehn [1985] for the USA and Leech/Leahy [1991] for the UK.
See Agrawal/Mandelker [1990], Jarrell/Poulsen [1987], Loderer/Martin [1997], McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995], Short/Keasey [1999], and Slovin/Sushka [1993].
See Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Agrawal/Mandelker [1990], Cho [1998], Jarrell/-Poulsen [1987], Loderer/Martin [1997], McConnell/Servaes [1990], and Mørck et al. [1988].
For further studies see Agrawal/Knoeber [1996], Mehran [1995], and Short/-Keasey [1999].
Himmelberg et al. [1999, p. 370].
See Becht/Röell [1999, p. 1052]. For an overview over the medians of selected European countries see Table A.1 in Appendix A.2, p. 220.
See Dyck/Zingales [2004, pp. 555–556].
See La Porta et al. [1999, p. 551].
See Faccio/Lang [2002, pp. 389–391] and La Porta et al. [1999, p. 551].
See Beyer [1996, pp. 89–91].
See La Porta et al. [1999, p. 499].
For a discussion on performance measures by research discipline see Hofer [1983].
For information on the CAPM see Lintner [1965], and Sharpe [1963, 1964].
See Mathiesen [2002, pp. 118–119]. For detailed calculation methods and an assessment of different types of CAR see Mathiesen [2002, pp. 120–131].
See Chaganti/Damanpour [1991, p. 484], Holl [1977, p. 263], and Stano [1976, p. 672].
See Mathiesen [2002, pp. 103–104]. For information on the causation and timing issues in the ownership performance relationship see Chapter 4.2.2, p. 74, and Chapter 4.2.3, p. 75.
Elliott [1972] uses a three-years-average, Stano [1976] a six-years-average; Holl [1977], Levin/Levin [1982], McEachern [1975], and Thonet/Poensgen [1979] extend the time period to ten years and Sorensen [1974] even uses 18 years. Chaganti/Damanpour [1991], Levin/Levin [1982], Sorensen [1974] and Thonet/-Poensgen [1979] use return on equity, return on assets and/or the market-to-book ratio as additional performance measures.
For studies using the ROE see Boudreaux [1973], Demsetz/Lehn [1985], Demsetz/-Villalonga [2001], Gugler et al. [2004], Jarrell/Poulsen [1988], Kamerschen [1968], Leech/Leahy [1991], Mak/Li [2001], Monsen et al. [1968], Mudambi/Nicosia [1998], Palmer [1973a,b], Pedersen/Thomsen [1999], and Short/Keasey [1999]; for those using ROA see Bøhren/Ødegaard [2003], Gedajlovic/Shapiro [2002], Himmelberg et al. [1999], Kole [1996], McConnell/Servaes [1990], and Mehran [1995]. For studies applying both measures see Chaganti/Damanpour [1991], Denis/Denis [1994], Kesner [1987], Lehmann/Weigand [2000], Murali/Welch [1989], Oswald/-Jahera Jr. [1991], Schellenger et al. [1989], and Steer/Cable [1978].
See Chaganti/Damanpour [1991], Denis/Denis [1994], Kesner [1987], Murali/-Welch [1989], Oswald/Jahera Jr. [1991], Schellenger et al. [1989], and Steer/Cable [1978].
For studies applying the return on investment see Gugler et al. [2003a, 2004] and Schellenger et al. [1989], for studies applying the earnings per share ratio see Kesner [1987] and Kim et al. [1988].
See Tobin [1978].
The following studies use the Tobin’s Q: Barnhart/Rosenstein [1998], Bøhren/-Ødegaard [2003], Chang [2003], Chen et al. [1993], Cho [1998], Cui/Mak [2002], DaDalt et al. [2003], Demsetz/Villalonga [2001], Gugler et al. [2004], Hermalin/-Weisbach [1991], Himmelberg et al. [1999], Loderer/Martin [1997], Mak/Li [2001], McConnell/Servaes [1990, 1995], Monsen et al. [1968], Mørck et al. [1988], Palia/-Lichtenberg [1999], and Weber/Dudney [2003].
For detailed information see Maddala [1992, Chapter 11].
See Chung/Pruitt [1994, p. 74].
See DaDalt et al. [2003, p. 537].
See Lindenberg/Ross [1981, pp. 10–17].
The other techniques as the ones of Lindenberg/Ross [1981] and Hall [1999] have even higher data requirements, making it hard to implement them.
See DaDalt et al. [2003, p. 551].
See Chung/Pruitt [1994, p. 71].
See Lindenberg/Ross [1981, pp. 10–11].
See Chung/Pruitt [1994, pp. 71–74].
For the calculation of the Tobin’s Q of Perfect/Wiles [1994] see Perfect/Wiles [1994, p. 322].
See DaDalt et al. [2003, pp. 550–551].
See Tobin [1978, p. 422].
It varied in values between low. 27 in 1920 and 1.83 in 1999. See Smithers/Wright [2000]. For more information and a detailed list of the Tobin’s Q over this time period see Appendix A.4, p. 225.
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(2007). Basic Aspects of Ownership Structure and Performance. In: Equity Ownership and Performance. Contributions to Economics. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1934-2_2
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