The role of regional conditions for poverty reduction and ODA

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


The previous three chapters have analyzed in detail the entire “ODA value chain” of aid provision, allocation and utilization. Without reviewing all the evidence and problems, it seems that donors’ attitude and motives towards giving aid is of particular importance. Even assuming that donors’ interest is solely led by the thought of reducing poverty worldwide, there are two sides confronting each other: The “optimists” and the “pessimists”, or as William Easterly points out in his book The White Man’s Burden, the “Planners” and the “Searchers”. The dissimilar viewpoints originate from a different understanding of whether and how aid works. Planners
  • argue that foreign aid provides additional financing, technical assistance and policy advice to low-income countries, thereby fostering economic development,

  • call for a substantial increase of ODA and favor a big plan in order to e-liminate poverty,

  • mostly follow general, blue-print-like, top-down strategies suggested and imposed by foreign, outside agencies,

  • set up global development objectives to be met within a predefined time frame,

  • utilize aid to develop countries and to transform bad governments into good ones.


Regional Condition Poverty Reduction Natural Capital Rural Poverty Dutch Disease 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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