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The allocation of ODA

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

The allocation of ODA does not take place by market forces as in the case of private capital flows. Rather it is the outcome of complex transactions and negotiations between donor and recipient as well as among donors. Both positive and normative questions frame the allocation decision and a variety of issues are of particular importance:
  • What is the actual aid allocation of bilateral and multilateral donors in recipient countries?

  • What are the motives behind the allocation decision (altruistic, (geo)political, historical ties, geographical and/or cultural proximity?)

  • Should aid be allocated according to the quality of impact it has in the recipient region or according to the needs of the recipient?

  • Should some countries be preferred or selected over others?

  • Is there an optimal allocation rule?

  • What are the policy lending/granting principles behind the allocation decision?

Keywords

Recipient Country Debt Relief Structural Adjustment Program Development Assistance Committee Poverty Reduction Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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