The provision of ODA

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)


A variety of events in the new Millennium (international conflicts, terrorist acts, natural disasters) have altered the landscape for ODA. Not only did they pave the way for increased strategically directed foreign aid and emergency assistance. The recent years have also witnessed a substantial increase in ODA, after a decade of “aid pessimism”, “donor fatigue” and almost continuous reductions in net disbursements. “Aid is back on the agenda”. The major bilateral donors have agreed at the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (2002) to expand their ODA in order to reach the Millennium Development Goals set by the UN for 2015. Under the motto “halving poverty by doubling aid”, it has been proposed from various sides (multilateral organizations, bilateral do-nors, politicians, economists, NGOs, well-known individuals) to signifi-cantly increase ODA flows, especially to least developed countries (LDCs). The development ministers of some donor countries demanded the year 2005 to be the turning year of development finance.


International Monetary Fund United Nations Development Finance Recipient Country Donor Country 
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