Advertisement

The Project Governance Model

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Keywords

Corporate Governance Development Project Audit Committee Integrity Management Discourse Ethic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Referencese

  1. 180.
    See Ulrich H. (1968/1970, 1984, 1978/1987); see further Rüegg-Stürm 2003 for the latest version of the St. Gallen Management Model.Google Scholar
  2. 181.
    2001a. See also 1999a, 2001c, 2002 and 2005.Google Scholar
  3. 182.
  4. 185.
    Ulrich H. 1984: 20.Google Scholar
  5. 186.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 10.Google Scholar
  6. 187.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 10.Google Scholar
  7. 188.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 10. As a case in point, see the ‘management vacuum’ in Chapter 1, illustrating the ‘dissolving’ effect, or how a development project risks falling apart without appropriate managerial influences.Google Scholar
  8. 190.
  9. 192.
    Ulrich H. 1984: 50 (translation Renz). See also Rüegg-Stürm 2003, 2004.Google Scholar
  10. 193.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2003: 17 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  11. 195.
    Ulrich H. 1984: 20 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  12. 196.
    1995: 31 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  13. 197.
    Malik & Probst 1984: 105. See also Rüegg-Stürm 2003: 19f.Google Scholar
  14. 198.
    Malik & Probst 1984: 105.Google Scholar
  15. 199.
    See Mann 2003 who views corporate governance as systems.Google Scholar
  16. 200.
    See Ulrich H. (1968/1970, 1984, 1978/1987); see further Rüegg-Stürm (2003, 2005) for the latest version of the St. Gallen Management Model.Google Scholar
  17. 201.
    See Ulrich H. 1984: 49ff.Google Scholar
  18. 202.
    Economies, for instance, are closed systems as long as their “entanglement with other spheres and appearances of the human society is not considered” (Ulrich H. 1984: 21).Google Scholar
  19. 203.
    Ulrich H. 1984: 59 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  20. 206.
    See also Ulrich P. 2001a.Google Scholar
  21. 207.
    SwissNGO 2005: 3.Google Scholar
  22. 208.
    See Footnote 202.Google Scholar
  23. 209.
    In particular Rüegg-Stürm 2003, 2004, 2005. For a broader understanding, see also Ulrich H. & Krieg 1972, Ulrich H. 2001, Bleicher 1991, Gomez 1998, Müller-Stewens & Lechner 2005. For an overview of the development of the St. Gallen Management Model, see Schwaninger 2001 and Spickers 2004.Google Scholar
  24. 210.
    Source Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 12 (development-specific adoption by the author).Google Scholar
  25. 211.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 11.Google Scholar
  26. 212.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2003: 22 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  27. 213.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2003: 22 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  28. 214.
    See Rüegg-Stürm 2003, 2004, 2005 for a detailed description of the different spheres.Google Scholar
  29. 215.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 17.Google Scholar
  30. 216.
    The Daily Star, March 26, 2004: 1 carries the headline, “Free fall of law, order mocks government measures.” The escalation of tension that came with the numerous bombings in the second half of 2005 is — very unfortunately — no surprise to the author.Google Scholar
  31. 217.
    The Daily Star, March 8, 2004: 6. According to the news report, the secretary general’s claim [of producing almost organic shrimps] was immediately refuted by the Swiss Charge d’affaires, who said that there was no place for ‘almost’ with shrimp, which must be ‘fully organic.’Google Scholar
  32. 218.
    The Daily Star, March 26, 2004: 1.Google Scholar
  33. 219.
    The Daily Star, March 8, 2004: 5.Google Scholar
  34. 220.
    The Daily Star, February 8, 2004: 17.Google Scholar
  35. 221.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 12.Google Scholar
  36. 224.
    The Daily Star, March 14 & 16, 2004.Google Scholar
  37. 225.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 22.Google Scholar
  38. 226.
  39. 229.
    Peter Eigen, founder of Transparency International, identified ‘relativism’ as one of the “worst liabilities which the western world committed” (speaking at the Sustainability Forum in Zürich on December 8, 2005).Google Scholar
  40. 230.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 22.Google Scholar
  41. 232.
    Mäkilouko 2001: 73.Google Scholar
  42. 234.
    House, Wright & Aditya 1996: 538.Google Scholar
  43. 235.
    See, for instance, Bachmann 2002.Google Scholar
  44. 236.
    See, for instance, the five value pairs as outlined by Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner: Universalism vs. particularism, communitarism vs. individualism, neutral vs. emotional cultures, diffuse vs. specific properties, achievement vs. ascription orientation. (2003: 29).Google Scholar
  45. 237.
    Tibi 1991.Google Scholar
  46. 238.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2004: 80 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  47. 239.
    See Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 54–55.Google Scholar
  48. 240.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 64.Google Scholar
  49. 241.
    Malik & Probst 1984: 105.Google Scholar
  50. 243.
    Gioia & Chittipeddi 1991: 443.Google Scholar
  51. 244.
    Adapted from Gioia & Chittipeddi, based on their ethnographic study of change management (1991: 443).Google Scholar
  52. 245.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 28.Google Scholar
  53. 247.
    See Müller-Stevens & Lechner 2005: 235.Google Scholar
  54. 248.
    DRIVER Project Document 2004: 8.Google Scholar
  55. 249.
    The author is aware that in practice the terms ‘vision’ and ‘mission’ are often used interchangeably. It is not the objective of this study to draw a clear separation between the two terms. Using only one of them, however, would deprive us of “the possibilities of revealing differentiation” (Müller-Stewens & Lechner 2005: 236, translation Renz).Google Scholar
  56. 250.
    Waxenberger 2001: 105 (translation Renz). See also Ulrich H. 2001: 461.Google Scholar
  57. 251.
    SDC 2004: 4.Google Scholar
  58. 252.
    Waxenberger 2003: 239. Though ‘project principles’ would be the more appropriate term, it is hardly known. In building on the common terminology I maintain the term business principles. See also Ulrich H. 2001: 461.Google Scholar
  59. 253.
    Waxenberger 2001: 85 translation Renz. See Ulrich P. 2001c: 45.Google Scholar
  60. 254.
    Waxenberger 2001: 112 translation Renz.Google Scholar
  61. 255.
    NZZ 8. Sep. 2005: 3 on the Volcker Report towards the UNO on the investigation of the “Oil for food” program in Iraq. See further Volcker, Goldstone & Pieth 2005.Google Scholar
  62. 257.
    See AusAID 2005, SECO 2005, Örtengren 2003. See also SDC 1999.Google Scholar
  63. 258.
    See Kaplan & Norton 1992. For an overview of various scorecard methods, see Müller-Stewens & Lechner 2005: 706 ff. For usage of balanced scorecards in projects, see Fiedler 2001: 69ff. For a critical analysis of BSCs, see also Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres & Kiel (2006). They point out that in government organizations of developing countries “implementation of the [scorecard] method by countries facing so many concurrent challenges would be difficult due to a lack of resources, politicization of public administration, and corruption” (2006: 1).Google Scholar
  64. 260.
    See SDC 1997 for monitoring on the level of the development project. See also Hilb 1997, 2002 for success-evaluation.Google Scholar
  65. 262.
    In recent years, worldwide development objectives have been substantially influenced by the capability approach founded by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (see Sen 1999, Nussbaum & Sen 1993). Therefore, the impact assessment would target changes in capabilities. A case study conducted by Patry (2005) suggests the technical feasibility for assessing capability change.Google Scholar
  66. 263.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 36.Google Scholar
  67. 264.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 36. See also Gomez et al. who argue that considering today’s high dynamics Chandler’s rule needs to be extended to “structure follows process follows strategy” (2002: 75). The high process-orientation was also crucial in our project, for which we created a process model, with respect to which all our activities were oriented. See also the characteristics of systemic thinking as stipulated by Hans Ulrich (see Chapter 4.1.3).Google Scholar
  68. 266.
    See SDC & Intercooperation 1995.Google Scholar
  69. 267.
    In fact Matta & Ashkenas draw on the insights gained by a major World Bank agricultural project in Nicaragua (See Matta & Ashkenas 2003).Google Scholar
  70. 268.
    Fuchs 1999: 145 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  71. 269.
  72. 270.
    Fuchs 1999: 146 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  73. 271.
    See Ulrich P. & Fluri 1995: 217ff, Thommen 2002: 212f on functional diagrams.Google Scholar
  74. 272.
    Malik 2002: 295 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  75. 273.
    Kupper 2001: 28 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  76. 274.
    See for instance Hilb 2005.Google Scholar
  77. 276.
    For more on board composition, see Hilb 2005: 70ff and Brönnimann 2003: 286ff.Google Scholar
  78. 277.
    See Hilb 2005: 107f for a list of the main tasks of the chair.Google Scholar
  79. 278.
    See Hilb 2005: 174ff.Google Scholar
  80. 279.
    Carter & Lorsch 2004: 178.Google Scholar
  81. 280.
    Hilb 2005: 140ff.Google Scholar
  82. 281.
    Hilb 2004: 134 (translation Renz). See further 2005: 142.Google Scholar
  83. 282.
    I use the term’ sounding board’ with reference to what Carter & Lorsch call “offering advice and counsel to management, especially the CEO” (which they name as one of the three key activities defining the board’s role; the other two “monitoring the company and management’s performance” and “making major decisions”) (2004: 67f).Google Scholar
  84. 284.
    Hilb 2005: 124ff.Google Scholar
  85. 285.
    Hilb 2005: 197ff. See also Hilb 1997, 2002 for success-evaluation.Google Scholar
  86. 286.
    Renz & Weichsler 2005: 15f.Google Scholar
  87. 287.
    See Crawford 2002.Google Scholar
  88. 288.
    Schwaninger 2005: 71 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  89. 289.
  90. 290.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 43. See Ulrich P. & Fluri 1995: 36ff, Lattmann 1990.Google Scholar
  91. 291.
  92. 292.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 42.Google Scholar
  93. 293.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 47.Google Scholar
  94. 294.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 46.Google Scholar
  95. 295.
    Simple questionnaires, for instance the ten comprehensive questions on board behavior suggested by Carter & Lorsch (2004: 178), may be a good starting point for such reflection. A more sophisticated questionnaire is presented by Hilb (2005: 198f). It has been adapted for nonprofit boards by Renz & Weichsler (2005: 15f).Google Scholar
  96. 296.
    Ulrich H. 2001: 459 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  97. 297.
    Hilb 2005: 82ff.Google Scholar
  98. 299.
    See Rüegg-Stürm on routinisation through structuring forces 2005: 46ff.Google Scholar
  99. 300.
    Waxenberger 2003: 235.Google Scholar
  100. 301.
    Paine 1997: 335 (emphasis Renz).Google Scholar
  101. 302.
  102. 304.
    Paine 1997: 335.Google Scholar
  103. 306.
    Paine 1997: 335.Google Scholar
  104. 307.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 286 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  105. 308.
    See Habermas 1981a, 1981b.Google Scholar
  106. 309.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 94 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  107. 310.
    See Ulrich P. 2001a: 57ff.Google Scholar
  108. 311.
    The importance of an ultimate foundation is known to the author. For instance, the lack of an ultimate rational foundation in Adam Smith’s construct for the standpoint of the impartial spectator is one of the criticisms directed at Smith’s theory of moral sentiment (see Ulrich P. 2001a: 63ff.). The ultimate foundation of discourse ethics, however, is also challenged by Wellmer and Maak, in that discourse ethics may “deprive itself of its moral-practical orientation power [if...] it aims too rigorously at the completion of its procedural ideals” (Maak 2001: 136; translation Renz). What is relevant for this book, however, is that a possible ultimate foundation be independent of cultural or religious rationality; or in Wellmer’s words, “not the completion of sense, but the elimination of non-sense is the principle of moral progress” (1986: 127).Google Scholar
  109. 312.
    See Ulrich P. 2001a: 57ff.Google Scholar
  110. 313.
    Teleological, from the Greek telos = target, goal, and Deontological from the Greek deon = obligation. See Ulrich P. 2001c: 45.Google Scholar
  111. 314.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 94 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  112. 315.
  113. 316.
    Crocker & Schenke 2005: 28.Google Scholar
  114. 317.
    See Kirsch 2004, Leisinger 2004, Steinmann 2004, von Cranach 2004.Google Scholar
  115. 318.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 78 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  116. 319.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 81 (translation and emphasis Renz).Google Scholar
  117. 320.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 82 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  118. 321.
  119. 322.
    See Ulrich P. 2001a: 82ff.Google Scholar
  120. 323.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 83 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  121. 324.
    See Blickle 1994: 10ff.; see further Groeben, Nüse & Gauler 1990: 3. In fact, discourse ethics is sometimes also called argumentation ethics!Google Scholar
  122. 325.
    See Palazzo: “The search for consensus [...] must be replaced by the search for the conditions of a reasonable disagreement” (2004: 52; translation Renz).Google Scholar
  123. 326.
    Habermas 1981: 385 ff. (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  124. 327.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 84f (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  125. 328.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 86 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  126. 329.
    Habermas 1991: 23 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  127. 330.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 87 (translation Renz). We will see later that for the context in which development projects take place a more differentiated concept of recognition is needed. For the moment, the principal guidelines of discourse ethics are outlined.Google Scholar
  128. 332.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 87 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  129. 333.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 88 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  130. 334.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 90 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  131. 335.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 91 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  132. 336.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 91 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  133. 337.
    See Waxenberger 2001, 2003.Google Scholar
  134. 338.
    See Ulrich P. 2001a: 92, 97ff, in particular 101: “Ethics provides criticalnormative orientation knowledge and not ‘implementable’ dispositional knowledge — it is not a social technique for a good cause.”Google Scholar
  135. 339.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 286 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  136. 340.
    See also Maak 1999: 146.Google Scholar
  137. 341.
    Habermas 1996: 62 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  138. 342.
    See Benhabib 1995: 40Google Scholar
  139. 343.
    1997. See also Honneth 2000, 2003.Google Scholar
  140. 344.
  141. 345.
    Pless & Maak: 2004: 131.Google Scholar
  142. 346.
    The roots of the term’ solidarity’ stem from the Latin phrase ‘obligatio in solidum’, meaning a reciprocal financial liability of the individual towards the community and vice versa. The term’ solidarity’ is widely used in ways that lie beyond the scope of this paper (see, for instance, Bayertz 1998: 11). Rather, this paper draws on the usage of solidarity from recognition ethics as described by Honneth and Maak.Google Scholar
  143. 347.
    Maak 1999. For a detailed description of the term, see Maak 1999: 78ff.Google Scholar
  144. 348.
    Pless & Maak 2004: 131.Google Scholar
  145. 349.
    Maak 1999: 99 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  146. 350.
    See UNO 1948.Google Scholar
  147. 351.
    Honneth 1997: 37 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  148. 352.
    Pless & Maak 2004: 132.Google Scholar
  149. 353.
    Pless & Maak 2004: 131. As an aside, Pless & Maak refer to recognition ethics in the context of “building an inclusive diversity culture.” They argue that ‘diversity culture,’ which is currently playing a prominent role in management theory and practice, can only be successful if “built on solid moral grounds.” Current practices of ‘assimilation’ or the focus on strategic diversity policies and processes have led many organizations to be “disappointed in their efforts” to build a diversity culture. International development projects face (not by choice, but by nature) the same challenges of diversity cultures, and hence the inclusion of recognition ethics into the context of this text seems to make a lot of sense.Google Scholar
  150. 354.
    Pless & Maak 2004: 131.Google Scholar
  151. 356.
    Paine 1997: 336.Google Scholar
  152. 357.
    In the terminology of knowledge management, the process model needs to foster single-loop learning, i.e. resolving the situational challenge at hand, as well as double-loop learning, i.e. reviewing the underlying constitutional strategies, structure, and organizational culture (see Argyris & Schön 1978).Google Scholar
  153. 359.
    Paine 1997: 336.Google Scholar
  154. 360.
    The model draws upon, and incorporates, several elements of Waxenberger’s organizational model for principle based management (see 2001, 2003).Google Scholar
  155. 361.
    Waxenberger 2003: 237.Google Scholar
  156. 363.
    See 3rd guideline of the normative foundation, Chapter 4.3.4.1, or Ulrich P. 2001a: 88.Google Scholar
  157. 367.
    Paine 1997: 335.Google Scholar
  158. 369.
    See www.transparency.org. On the ethical problem of corruption, see also Ulrich H. 2001: 322f, Leisinger 1997: 62–83, Stückelberger 2001, Eigen 2003.Google Scholar
  159. 370.
    Leisinger 1997: 96 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  160. 371.
    Arvis & Berenbeim 2003: 9.Google Scholar
  161. 372.
    TI 2000: xviii, adapted from Caiden 1988.Google Scholar
  162. 373.
    Ulrich P. & Maak 2000a: 28. See Michelman: “Corruption is the subversion, within the political motivation of any participant, of the general good by particular interest” (1986: 40). See also Ulrich P. 1999b: 60 and Ulrich P. 2001a.Google Scholar
  163. 374.
  164. 375.
    The ‘Business principles for countering bribery’ (an initiative of Transparency International and Social Accountability International) mention two steps: (1) “Prohibit bribery in any form” and (2) “Commit to implement a programme to counter bribery” (TI 2002). The approach here is adapted to projects in particular, and therefore it is less isolated and more holistic, as it makes corruption part of an integrated integrity management through the leadership endorsed project governance. Otherwise, it is left to the discretion of single project managers as it was the case in the project observed in the case study.Google Scholar
  165. 376.
  166. 378.
    See also Wallace & Zinkin, who emphasize the need for good corporate governance to resolve the typical conflicts of interest in the principal — agent relationship (2005: 2).Google Scholar
  167. 381.
    Concise Oxford English Dictionary 2004.Google Scholar
  168. 382.
  169. 383.
  170. 384.
  171. 385.
    ILO 2002. It is further stated that “although such practices might on the surface appear to be minor single actions, they can have a very serious effect. It has been estimated, for example, that about 10–15 per cent of suicides in Sweden each year have this type of background.”Google Scholar
  172. 386.
    See the 3rd guideline of the normative foundation, Chapter 4.3.4.1, respectively Ulrich P. 2001a: 88.Google Scholar
  173. 388.
    Kast 1987: 39 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  174. 389.
    Fest 2005. Further: “We need to accept the evil in our accounts of the human being stronger than it happened since the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment pretended that the human being is good and it is only because of external influences that he falls into the evil. That is wrong. There is the possibility for good and evil in the human being. We think of this too little in the western industrialized nations.” Questions of good and evil in human beings are core phi-dustrialized nations.” Questions of good and evil in human beings are core philosophical debates. While they go beyond the scope of this book, the possibility of their existence is acknowledged. (See also Neiman 2002, Tibi 1991).Google Scholar
  175. 390.
    OECD 2004: 62.Google Scholar
  176. 391.
    Gandossy & Sonnenfeld 2004: 147. See also Leisinger 2003 and 1997: 130–141.Google Scholar
  177. 392.
    Oxford English Dictionary 1989 & 2003.Google Scholar
  178. 393.
    Lucas 2004 (emphasis Renz).Google Scholar
  179. 394.
    Oxford English Dictionary (emphasis Renz).Google Scholar
  180. 395.
    Ulrich P. 2001: 84 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  181. 396.
    Sonnenfeld 2002: 16. See also Hilb, who underlines the importance of a culture of trust enabled through ying-yang team cooperation rules (2005: 82–85).Google Scholar
  182. 397.
    Honderich 1995: 647.Google Scholar
  183. 398.
  184. 399.
    Pless & Maak 2004: 132.Google Scholar
  185. 401.
    Peter & Kraut 2000: 19 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  186. 402.
    In modification of Rüegg-Stürm’s definition 2005: 12.Google Scholar
  187. 403.
    DFID 1995: 3. DFID is the British Department of International Development. See Wood, who points at the dependencies with the following paradox: “the interdependence of many charitable nonprofits and government units is incompatible with the assumption that the sector is ‘independent’” (1996: 5).Google Scholar
  188. 404.
    See Hickey & Mohan 2005: 239ff for a comprehensive overview of approaches to participation in development.Google Scholar
  189. 405.
  190. 406.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 438 (translation Renz). See also Post, Preston & Sachs (2002: 198ff) who stress the learning processes involving stakeholders, another facet of the pluralistic value chain arrangement.Google Scholar
  191. 407.
    See Fuchs analyzing the project management of (business) cooperation. He defines cooperation as “the voluntary collaboration of two or more legally independent enterprises with the aim to pursue common and individual objectives” (1999: 25; translation Renz).Google Scholar
  192. 408.
    DFID 1995: 9.Google Scholar
  193. 409.
    See Ulrich P. 2001a: 441ff. See also Wilbers (2004) and Rüegg-Stürm (2002, 2005) building on P. Ulrich’s distinction.Google Scholar
  194. 410.
    Freeman 1984.Google Scholar
  195. 411.
    See Gomez et al. 2002: 88.Google Scholar
  196. 412.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 442 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  197. 413.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2005: 20. See Ulrich P. 2001a: 442ff.Google Scholar
  198. 414.
    Ulrich P. 2001a: 450 (translation Renz). See also Post, Preston & Sachs who talk of “organizational morality” forming the “normative core of the stakeholder model: legitimate stakeholder interests require managerial recognition [!] and attention as a matter of moral right” (2002: 29; emphasis Renz).Google Scholar
  199. 415.
    See Ulrich P. 2001a: 443. See also Kirsch 1997, in particular the comment under Footnote 137.Google Scholar
  200. 418.
    Wilbers 2004: 331ff. In contrast to Wilber, the proposed model merges the two steps of classifying and assessing stakeholders: Particularly from the perspective of the normative critical stakeholder concept, the distinction remains ambiguous. A second enhancement is that a monitoring step is added, as suggested in a similar model by Gomez et al. (2002: 86ff). Thirdly, the normatively critical concept is complemented by elements of recognition ethics.Google Scholar
  201. 419.
    The matrix is inspired by Gomez et al. (see 2002: 89), and enhanced so as to be consistent with the categories of the St. Gallen Management Model.Google Scholar
  202. 420.
    See Paris declaration on aid effectiveness (2005) in its call for more efficiency in project implementation units.Google Scholar
  203. 421.
    Wilbers 2004: 354 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  204. 423.
    See, for instance, Müller-Stewens & Lechner 2005, Gomez et al. 2002, Wilbers 2004.Google Scholar
  205. 424.
    See DFID 1995.Google Scholar
  206. 425.
    Wilbers 2004: 355 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  207. 426.
    See Ulrich P. 2001a: 438ff, 459.Google Scholar
  208. 427.
    Wilbers 2004: 335 (translation Renz). See Dyllick & Meyer 2004: 120ff.Google Scholar
  209. 429.
    See, for instance, Gomez et al. 2002: 85ff.Google Scholar
  210. 430.
    See Fuchs 1999: 176ff on the need for an effective controlling of business partnerships and co-operations.Google Scholar
  211. 433.
    Hilb 2005: 165.Google Scholar
  212. 434.
    Thomsett 2004: 1. This inconsistency is also mirrored in the corporate governance literature in particular: Monks & Minow (2004), Steger (2004), Carter & Lorsch (2004) merely mention risk management, while Schwarz fails to mention it (2005) in his discussion of nonprofit organizations.Google Scholar
  213. 435.
    See Hamel & Prahalad 1997.Google Scholar
  214. 437.
    See, for instance, Hilb 2005, Boutellier & Kalia 2004, 2005.Google Scholar
  215. 439.
    Thommen 2000: 472 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  216. 440.
    Boutellier & Kalia 2005: 6.Google Scholar
  217. 441.
    Boutellier & Kalia 2005: 8.Google Scholar
  218. 442.
    Adapted from Bodenmann 2005: 113 and IFAC (International Federation of Accountants) 1999: 7.Google Scholar
  219. 443.
    Thomsett 2004: 4. See PMI 2003: 82, Keiser 2005: 160, IFAC 1999: 15.Google Scholar
  220. 444.
    DRIVER 2002.Google Scholar
  221. 445.
    Rüegg-Stürm 2003: 14.Google Scholar
  222. 453.
    FMEA = Failure-Mode-and-Effect-Analysis. See McDermott, Mikulak & Beauregard 1996 or Dailey 2004.Google Scholar
  223. 454.
    Boutellier & Kalia 2004, 2005.Google Scholar
  224. 455.
    There is abundant literature on risk assessment, mainly on the level of project management (see, for instance, PMI 2003, 2004, Gassmann, Kobe & Voit 2001, Schott & Campana 2005, Fiedler 2001, Buchta, Eul & Schulte-Croonenberg 2004, Führer & Züger 2005). The process summarized here draws on elements common to these approaches, supplemented by insights from the case study and by contributions of specifically mentioned authors.Google Scholar
  225. 456.
    Boutellier & Kalia 2004: 10.Google Scholar
  226. 457.
    Lambert 2003: 2.Google Scholar
  227. 458.
    Lambert 2003: 3.Google Scholar
  228. 459.
    See Boutellier & Kalia 2005: 8 and Chapter 4.5.2.1.Google Scholar
  229. 460.
    Enhanced from Swisscom 2001, cited in Haller 2004 and Boutellier & Kalia 2005.Google Scholar
  230. 461.
    Boutellier & Kalia 2004: 9.Google Scholar
  231. 463.
    For instance, resolving or identifying a technical issue during the landing of an airplane on a carrier: This kind of fluidly adaptive and immediate reaction draws on the characteristics of high reliability organizations when handling a crisis. See Schulman et. al. 2004.Google Scholar
  232. 464.
    Adapted from Boutellier & Gassmann 2001: 39.Google Scholar
  233. 465.
    Hilb 2005: 171ff based on KPMG 2003.Google Scholar
  234. 466.
    2004: 103ff.Google Scholar
  235. 467.
    Adapted from Keiser 2005: 165.Google Scholar
  236. 468.
    See PwC 2005: 5ff, Hilb 2005: 158.Google Scholar
  237. 469.
    Ulrich P. & Fluri 1995: 152 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  238. 470.
    IIA — Institute of Internal Auditor 2005a (emphasis Renz).Google Scholar
  239. 471.
    See COSO Framework 1992, Hilb 2005: 164.Google Scholar
  240. 472.
    Ulrich P. & Fluri 1995: 152 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  241. 474.
    IIA — Institute of Internal Auditor 2005b: 2.Google Scholar
  242. 475.
    Hilb, for instance, suggests the creation of an “integrated Audit & Risk Management Committee for quoted companies” (2005: 157).Google Scholar
  243. 476.
    See Economiesuisse 2002, paragraph 23, 24 and annex 8.Google Scholar
  244. 478.
    KPMG 2002: 25.Google Scholar
  245. 479.
    PwC 2005: 4 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  246. 480.
    PwC 2005: 4 (translation Renz).Google Scholar
  247. 481.
    Schweiz. Bundesanwaltschaft 2003.Google Scholar
  248. 482.
    Swiss NPO-Code 2005: 16Google Scholar
  249. 485.
    IIA — Institute of Internal Auditors 2005a.Google Scholar
  250. 487.
    See COSO Framework 1992, Hilb 2005: 164.Google Scholar
  251. 489.
    Hilb 2005: 158.Google Scholar
  252. 490.
    Hilb 2005: 158.Google Scholar
  253. 491.
    See PwC 2005.Google Scholar
  254. 493.
    Hilb 2005: 158.Google Scholar
  255. 495.
    Hilb 2005: 157ff.Google Scholar
  256. 496.
    Not within the scope of this text are possible organizational measures within the project unit. One might discuss how the project delivers on its own auditrelated requirements, consisting principally of the internal control tasks with respect to financial and operational control. As for what project size justifies the hiring of a full time internal controller, who would report not to the financial manager but to the governance board (or to the project manager though less ideal). A benchmark study on internal control in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (Füss 2004) mentions that in NPOs there is around 1 person per 160 employees, while in banks 1 per 60 employees works in internal control with a (mean value 6.3 respectively for 16.67 per 1000 employees). Obviously, the number of employees represents only a partial comparison criterion. If, however, development projects are considered high-risk endeavors (which from the political and ethical perspectives perspective is the case), then bigger development projects are justified to invest project internal resources into dedicated internal control staff. In the case example, in fact, one of the donors requested a full time external auditor. Unfortunately, it did not materialize — possibly because its value was not understood as supporting a strategic audit management within integrated project governance.Google Scholar
  257. 498.
    See Jans’ comment on “internal control as a catalyst” (2003: 1).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2007

Personalised recommendations