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The roles of governance in development projects

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Keywords

Corporate Governance Development Project Stakeholder Theory Agency Theory Institutional Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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© Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2007

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