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Fuzzy Core and Effective Coalitions

  • Milan Mareš
Part of the Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing book series (STUDFUZZ, volume 72)

Abstract

The concept of a core in a fuzzy extension of a coalition game with side-payments will be naturally based on fuzzy analogues of (3.5) and (3.6). A heuristic analysis of the investigated model leads to the conclusion that a core of a fuzzified game is to be fuzzified as well. The vagueness entering the game by means of uncertain expectations of coalitional profits is also reflected by the vagueness connected with outputs of the game including the concept of a core. In the deterministic game, the core C is a subset of R I. Hence, in the fuzzy extension it should also be a fuzzy subset of the same set, as shown, e.g., in [33].

Keywords

Membership Function Fuzzy Subset Coalition Structure Coalition Game Stable Coalition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Milan Mareš
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Information Theory and AutomationAcademy of Sciences of the Czech RepublicPrague 8Czech Republic

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