Abstract
A symposium about the relationship of artificial intelligence and evidence law is at the cutting edge of scholarship on the theory of evidence law; bringing economics into it might seem to be too much of a good thing. Economic models are relevant here because, like computer programs, they depend on formal logic. Overreliance on formal logic, and on a concomitant unrealistic assumption about our cognitive capacity, may lead formal models — whether computer programs, equations, or economic analyses — to ignore important aspects of human intelligence. As a result, formalisms may fail to capture important aspects of human intelligence, and, accordingly, may mislead those who rely on them for an understanding of how humans can, or should, resolve issues of fact.
The author would like to thank William Page, Ron Shapira, and Peter Tillers for helpful conversations, and Kym Gore and Jennifer Johnson for research assistance.
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© 2002 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg
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Callen, C.R. (2002). Othello Could Not Optimize: Economics, Hearsay, and Less Adversary Systems. In: MacCrimmon, M., Tillers, P. (eds) The Dynamics of Judicial Proof. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 94. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1792-8_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1792-8_22
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
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