Hysteresis in an Evolutionary Labor Market with Adaptive Search

  • Leigh Tesfatsion
Part of the Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing book series (STUDFUZZ, volume 100)


This study undertakes a systematic experimental investigation of hysteresis (path dependency) in an agent-based computational labor market framework. It is shown that capacity asymmetries between work suppliers and employers can result in two distinct hysteresis effects, network and behavioral, when work suppliers and employers interact strategically and evolve their worksite behaviors over time. These hysteresis effects result in persistent heterogeneity in earnings and employment histories across agents who have no observable structural differences. At a more global level, these hysteresis effects are shown to result in a one-to-many mapping between treatment factors and experimental outcomes. These hysteresis effects may help to explain why excess earnings heterogeneity is commonly observed in real-world labor markets.


Trade Cycle Work Offer Utility Level Distance Cluster Final Generation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leigh Tesfatsion
    • 1
  1. 1.Iowa State UniversityAmesUSA

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