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Formation of Virtual Organizations in Grids: A Game-Theoretic Approach

  • Chapter
Economic Models and Algorithms for Distributed Systems

Part of the book series: Autonomic Systems ((ASYS))

Abstract

The execution of large scale grid applications requires the use of several computational resources owned by various Grid Service Providers (GSPs). GSPs must form Virtual Organizations (VOs) to be able to provide the composite resource to these applications. We consider grids as self-organizing systems composed of autonomous, self-interested GSPs that will organize themselves into VOs with every GSP having the objective of maximizing its profit. We formulate the resource composition among GSPs as a coalition formation problem and propose a game-theoretic framework based on cooperation structures to model it. Using this framework, we design a resource management system that supports the VO formation among GSPs in a grid computing system.

This research was supported in part by NSF grant DGE-0654014.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Wayne State University, 5143 Cass Avenue, Detroit, MI, 48202, USA

    Thomas E. Carroll & Daniel Grosu

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  1. Thomas E. Carroll
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  2. Daniel Grosu
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kollegiengebäude II, Platz Alten Synagoge, 79085, Freiburg, Germany

    Dirk Neumann (Chair for Information Systems) (Chair for Information Systems)

  2. ACET Centre, School of Systems Engineering, The University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading, Berkshire, RG6 6AY, UK

    Mark Baker (Research Professor of Computer Science) (Research Professor of Computer Science)

  3. Technology Management, Economics & Policy Program, College of Engineering Seoul National University, San 56-1, Shillim-Dong, Gwanak-Gu, Seoul, 151-742, South Korea

    Jörn Altmann

  4. School of Computer Science, Cardiff University, Queen’s Buildings, Newport Road, Cardiff, CF24 3AA, UK

    Omer Rana

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© 2009 Birkhäuser Verlag Basel/Switzerland

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Carroll, T.E., Grosu, D. (2009). Formation of Virtual Organizations in Grids: A Game-Theoretic Approach. In: Neumann, D., Baker, M., Altmann, J., Rana, O. (eds) Economic Models and Algorithms for Distributed Systems. Autonomic Systems. Birkhäuser, Basel. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7643-8899-7_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7643-8899-7_5

  • Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Basel

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7643-8896-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7643-8899-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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