Reputation, Pricing and the E-Science Grid

  • Arun Anandasivam
  • Dirk Neumann
Part of the Autonomic Systems book series (ASYS)


One of the fundamental aspects for an efficient Grid usage is the optimization of resource allocation among the participants. However, this has not yet materialized. Each user is a self-interested participant trying to maximize his utility whereas the utility is not only determined by the fastest completion time, but on the prices as well. Future revenues are influenced by users’ reputation. Reputation mechanisms help to build trust between loosely coupled and geographically distributed participants. Providers need an incentive to reduce selfish cancellation of jobs and privilege own jobs. In this chapter we present first an offline scheduling mechanism with a fixed price. Jobs are collected by a broker and scheduled to machines. The goal of the broker is to balance the load and to maximize the revenue in the network. Consumers can submit their jobs according to their preferences, but taking the incentives of the broker into account. This mechanism does not consider reputation. In a second step a reputation-based pricing mechanism for a simple, but fair pricing of resources is analyzed. In e-Science researchers do not appreciate idiosyncratic pricing strategies and policies. Their interest lies in doing research in an efficient manner. Consequently, in our mechanism the price is tightly coupled to the reputation of a site to guarantee fairness of pricing and facilitate price determination. Furthermore, the price is not the only parameter as completion time plays an important role, when deadlines have to be met. We provide a flexible utility and decision model for every participant and analyze the outcome of our reputation-based pricing system via simulation.


Completion Time Price Scheme Grid Resource Reputation System Grid Network 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Birkhäuser Verlag Basel/Switzerland 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arun Anandasivam
    • 1
  • Dirk Neumann
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Karlsruhe (TH)KarlsruheGermany
  2. 2.Platz der Alten SynagogeUniversity of FreiburgFreiburgGermany

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