The fictional nature of scientific notions
Popper1, Kuhn2, and Fleck3, as diverse as their science philosophies might appear (see chapters 3, 4), have agreed in noting that all hypotheses, paradigms, thought styles, respectively, have been transient episodes in the history of science, notions replaced by new notions soon to be revised again. Notions in science may be based on experimental observations that may be fundamentally correct. Nevertheless, the experimental observations acquire their meaning only if they are interpreted. In order to make scientific sense, observations are explained within the constraints of a current thought style. What results are fictional notions of imagined realities.
KeywordsScientific Practice Scientific Fact Scientific Methodology Thought Style Robust Knowledge
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Chapter 15 References
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