Abstract
Researchers in fault tolerance have long made use of the notion of a failure model, which describes the different ways a component in a system can fail. For example, a node can fail quietly (that is, it send out no information), it can fail with respect to timing (that is, send out information too late), it can fail arbitrarily, or it can fail maliciously. The intent of the failure model for fault tolerance is to make it possible to develop different types of algorithms that address different kinds of failures.
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References
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© 1995 Springer-Verlag/Wien
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Meadows, C. (1995). The Need for a Failure Model for Security. In: Cristian, F., Le Lann, G., Lunt, T. (eds) Dependable Computing for Critical Applications 4. Dependable Computing and Fault-Tolerant Systems, vol 9. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-9396-9_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-9396-9_30
Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna
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