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Part of the book series: Dependable Computing and Fault-Tolerant Systems ((DEPENDABLECOMP,volume 9))

Abstract

The scope of “denial-of-service protection” can be limited by comparing it and contrasting it with related concepts. The objectives and general concepts that drive current research have already been clarified to some extent by prior work. We summarize the general conclusions that have emerged, and assess their implications for the development of denial-of-service protection requirements and the guidance of future research.

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© 1995 Springer-Verlag/Wien

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Millen, J.K. (1995). Denial of Service: A Perspective. In: Cristian, F., Le Lann, G., Lunt, T. (eds) Dependable Computing for Critical Applications 4. Dependable Computing and Fault-Tolerant Systems, vol 9. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-9396-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-9396-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7091-9398-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7091-9396-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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