Temporally Conditioned Descriptions and the Concept of Temporal Purity
Part of the LEP Library of Exact Philosophy book series (LEP, volume 3)
It is a commonplace fact that an event, state of affairs, or object is never to be described only by means of some one single and unique description: there must inevitably be a multiplicity of distinct descriptions (both definite and indefinite descriptions) which describe or single out the same thing. Given a pair of definite descriptions D1 and D2 such that what is referred to by the description D1 — the descriptum of D1 — is the same as or identical with the descriptum of D2, it is well known that such an inference as the following fails:
Smith believes that —D1—; therefore
Smith believes that —D2—.
KeywordsDefinite Description Logical Truth Temporal Juncture Complete Inventory Essential Reference
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- 1.Critique of Pure Reason, A 31/B 47; tr. By N.K. Smith (New York, 1929), p. 75.Google Scholar
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