Law and Logic pp 196-198 | Cite as

General Conclusion

  • Joseph Horovitz
Part of the Library of Exact Philosophy book series (LEP, volume 8)


The thesis that legal argument and legal logic are nonformal in nature appears inherently ambiguous. Its several versions referring to nonformal “arguments” or “reasoning” should in fact be construed as applying to arguments and linguistic processes of various kinds, viz.: nonformalized arguments, inconclusive arguments, and arguments accompanied by methodological information; activities of convincing and persuading; heuristic processes involving choice and decision, often accompanied by an intuition of evidence or acceptability; interpretation that disregards ordinary meanings; operations of theoretical construction; operations carried out according to rules of procedure; processes by which systems develop; and complex processes in which arguments may be included. Similarly, the formulations referring or alluding to “nonformal logic” should in fact be construed as applying to various fields, in particular to the following: applied logic, pragmatics of reasoning, heuristics, methodology, the study of the evolution of systems, and complex fields of inquiry, possibly comprising (formal) logic as a component.


Legal System Legal Rule Semantic Concept Applied Logic Semantic Context 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag/Wien 1972

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph Horovitz

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