A Pseudoformalistic Position: Klug
In the introductory section of his Legal Logic 3, Klug declares that by “logic” he means formal logic. He seems to believe that his conception of logic closely follows that of Carnap. Yet, in his Introduction he characterizes logic in general as part of the theory of science, viz. that part of it which provides the technique of scientific proof. This conception of logic is not quite consistent with Carnap’s views. In the first place, for Carnap only predicative logic, i. e. the logic of indicative sentences suitable for the formulation of factual statements, is a part of the theory of science. But he also recognizes the logic of “optatives”, i. e. sentences suitable to express a wish, a command, a decision, an assent, etc.4 Moreover, while Carnap identifies the logic of science with the syntax and semantics of the language of science, Klug confines formal logic to scientific proof. Finally, in identifying logic with syntax and semantics, Carnap excludes from its sphere all pragmatic investigation. On the other hand, Klug’s reference to the technique of proof seems to suggest that he conceives of logic as having a pragmatic dimension.
KeywordsLegal System Legal Rule Analogical Argument Legal Argument Minor Premise
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