Skip to main content

Knowing by Means of Concepts

  • Chapter
  • 208 Accesses

Part of the book series: LEP Library of Exact Philosophy ((LEP,volume 11))

Abstract

What is a concept? A concept is to be distinguished from an intuitive image above all by the fact that it is completely determined and has nothing uncertain about it. One might be tempted to say — and many logicians have indeed said — that a concept is simply an image with a strictly fixed content. As we have seen, however, there are no such entities in psychological reality because all images are to one degree or another vague. One might of course suppose that images with fixed content are at least possible; but this supposition would still be limited to individual images. It would not apply at all in the case of general ideas or images, and these are what we need for knowing; for, as we have just made clear, general images cannot possibly exist as real mental entities.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Literatur

  1. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II, pp. 61 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  2. C. Stumpf, Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen, in: Abhandlungen der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss., 1906.

    Google Scholar 

  3. O. Külpe, in his Die Realisierung (Vol. I, p. 226), presented the same view of the nature of concepts: “For objective science, concepts are ‘fixed coordinations’ between signs and signified objects.” (Transi. AEB.)

    Google Scholar 

  4. E. Husserl, op. cit., pp. 23–61.

    Google Scholar 

  5. D. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Book I, Part I, near the end of section VII.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1974 Springer-Verlag/Wien

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Schlick, M. (1974). Knowing by Means of Concepts. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7091-3101-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7091-3099-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics