On Inductive Knowledge

  • Moritz Schlick
Part of the LEP Library of Exact Philosophy book series (LEP, volume 11)


The question of the validity of knowledge of reality has found, in the pages above, a perhaps unwanted but not unexpected answer. The more familiar we grew with the wellsprings of human cognition the clearer it became that all synthetic judgments are a posteriori in both origin and validity.


Inductive Inference Prob Ability Ordinary Life Causal Principle Minor Premiss 


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  1. 48.
    Hans Reichenbach, in his little book Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori, has expressed the opinion (which he must surely no longer hold) that my theory of the uniqueness of correlation in knowing is basically also a synthetic judgment a priori and that I have thus unwittingly taken over the erroneous portion of the Kantian philosophy. This view is of course quite wrong, since my account of knowledge and truth by means of the concept of correlation is simply a definition and thus most certainly a purely analytic judgment.Google Scholar

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© Springer-Verlag/Wien 1974

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  • Moritz Schlick

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