Abstract
Since temporality is the criterion of reality, and since reality must be ascribed to the transcendent world, it would seem to follow that the things of the transcendent world are temporal in the same sense as the immediately given world of consciousness. This would also appear to follow with respect to spatiality, since in the case of natural objects spatial and temporal determinations go hand in hand. Thus the conclusion seems inescapable that the realm of transcendent objects is extended in time and generally in space as well, that consequently the doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time — given such wide recognition since Kant — is incompatible with our results. For on this doctrine both space and time are merely forms of our intuition and do not apply to the things-in-themselves. But this conclusion would be premature. Our findings do not provide premisses adequate to sustain it.
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References
On the matters discussed in this section, see my paper Erscheinung und Wesen, Kantstudien, 1918.
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© 1974 Springer-Verlag/Wien
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Schlick, M. (1974). The Subjectivity of Time. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_28
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