Abstract
From the foregoing considerations we have gained the insight that the area of the real is not to be identified with the area of the “given”. It most certainly extends much farther. Our critique of attempts to establish this identification did not have simply a negative character. Every argument directed against such efforts was at the same time a proof of the existence of realities that are not given, that transcend consciousness.
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The term ‘phenomenalism’ here is of course used in a sense quite different from that found in Anglo-American philosophy. [Translator’s note.]
The word ‘phenomenalism’ is not always used in the same sense. For example, Hans Kleinpeter (in his work Der Phänomenalismus) uses the term to designate philosophical currents that we have just criticized in §§ 25 and 26.
This is acknowledged likewise by many modern criticists; for example, see R. Hönigswald, Beiträge zur Erkenntnistheorie und Methodenlehre (1906), pp. 115 ff. Petzoldt (Weltproblem, p. 190) seems, in his criticism of the above passages, to have overlooked the fact that there I was describing not my own viewpoint but that of phenomenalism.
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© 1974 Springer-Verlag/Wien
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Schlick, M. (1974). Essence and “Appearance”. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_27
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