Abstract
We claim that everything is real that must be thought of as being at a specific time.
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References
Wilhelm Schuppe, Erkenntnistheoretische Logik, p. 69.
See, for instance, the excellent discussion by W. Freytag, Der Realismus und das Transzendenzproblem, Part VII, 1902;
also G. Störring, Erkenntnistheorie, 2nd edition, 1920, p. 73.
That every judgment as such transcends the given is shown very well by W. Freytag, Erkenntnistheorie, 2nd edition, 1920, pp. 123 ff.
Mach, Analyse der Empfindungen, 5th edition, p. 24, note.
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kehrbach edition, pp. 326,329.
Viktor Stern, Die logischen Mängel der Machschen Antimeta-physik und die realistische Ergänzung seines Positivismus, Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 38 (1914), p. 391.
See Stern’s very sound refutation, in the work cited above, of certain inadequate arguments directed against Mach.
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Schlick, M. (1974). Things-In-Themselves and the Notion of Immanence. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_25
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