• Moritz Schlick
Part of the LEP Library of Exact Philosophy book series (LEP, volume 11)


We have denied the existence of a special experience of “self-evidence”, which infallibly points out to us the truth of a true sentence. The question then arises naturally: Through which data of consciousness may truth then be recognized? What is the criterion that assures us of truth? This question we have not yet answered directly; but we posses all the data required to do so.


Identity Experience Unique Correlation True Sentence Conceptual Truth Minor Premiss 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag/Wien 1974

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  • Moritz Schlick

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