Abstract
The foregoing considerations have clarified the problems of pure thought by answering the question: What are the special features of mental processes through which we obtain unmistakable insight into the truth of judgments that rest on the analysis of concepts? In our discussion, we have often had to overcome widely shared preconceptions that prevent us from understanding the true state of affairs. In retrospect and as a summary, we wish to place our results in still clearer view by seeking to eliminate once and for all those fundamental errors that have constantly cast shadows across these problems and have obscured the ideas about consciousness entertained by philosophers, both ancient and modern.
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References
See, for example, A. Höfler, Grundlehren der Logik, 4th edition, 1907, p. 82.
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© 1974 Springer-Verlag/Wien
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Schlick, M. (1974). On Self-Evidence. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna
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