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The Analytic Character of Rigorous Inference

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General Theory of Knowledge

Part of the book series: LEP Library of Exact Philosophy ((LEP,volume 11))

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Abstract

The more important and comprehensive the role played by the syllogistic form in rigorous inference, the more sensitive does pure thought become to any criticism that attacks the actual import and usefulness of this kind of inference. This, perhaps, is what motivates the efforts, referred to just above, of those who do not wish to see the exact inferences in the sciences come under the jurisdiction of the syllogism. For it is a well-known fact that philosophy long ago passed a very harsh judgment on the value of syllogistic inference for human knowledge.

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References

  1. Wundt, Logik I, 2nd edition, p. 322.

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  2. Sigwart, Logik I, 3rd edition, p. 479.

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  3. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, § 14.

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  4. Störring, Erkenntnistheorie, 1920, p. 250.

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  5. A. Riehl, Beiträge zur Logik, 2nd edition, p. 53.

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  6. E. Dürr, who incidentally treats this class of inferences in a similar fashion, came close to this view (Erkenntnistheorie, Leipzig 1910, pp. 68ff.). He did not reach it fully because he overlooked the fact that these inferences hold strictly only for number concepts. He says (op. cit., p. 69): “The concept of B does not contain the fact that C is located to its right.” Of course not. But the concept of a definite number (which gives the empirically observed position of B) does contain the fact that the number is larger than a certain other number (which has been shown by experience to be the number that determines the position of the object C).

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  7. A. Riehl, Beiträge zur Logik, 2nd edition, p. 53.

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  8. For example, the discovery of “new” fields of pure mathematics means simply the formation of new combinations of concepts.

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© 1974 Springer-Verlag/Wien

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Schlick, M. (1974). The Analytic Character of Rigorous Inference. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Vienna

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7091-3101-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7091-3099-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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