Abstract
Anyone who looks at the findings obtained thus far concerning the nature of knowledge will perhaps fall prey to a certain feeling of disappointment22. Is knowledge nothing more than a mere designating? If so, does the human mind not remain forever a stranger to and remote from the things, processes and relations it wishes to know? Can it never effect a more intimate union with the objects of this world, of which it too is a member?
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References
A typical expression of this appears in the following words from a review of the first edition of this book: “It is incomprehensible to this reviewer how anyone who has ever struggled to obtain an insight can be satisfied with this point of view” (Jahrbücher über die Fortschritte der Mathematik, 1923).
In connection with what follows, see my article “Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis?”, Viertel Jahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie 37 (1913), pp. 472–488.
H. Bergson, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Jena 1901, p. 26.
E. Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, Logos I, (1910/11), p. 341.
Among these I cite A. Riehl, who contrasts immediate acquaintance with understanding (Der philosophische Kritizismus, II, i, p. 221), and B. Russell, who distinguishes quite correctly between “knowledge of things” (Kennen) and “knowledge of truths” (Erkennen). For this, see The Problems of Philosophy, p. 69. Also see E. von Aster, Prinzipien der Erkenntnislehre, 1913, pp. 6 ff.
F. Paulsen in P. Hinneberg’s volume Systematische Philosophie, 1907, p. 397.
The same truth lies at the base of the somewhat involved comment that Kant makes on the Cartesian thesis, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kehrbach edition, p. 696.
F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 185.
F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 181.
F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 188.
F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 277.
L. Nelson draws the opposite conclusion (Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie, Abhandlungen der Friesschen Schule, III, 1912, p. 598). He argues that since a perception is knowledge but is not a judgment, therefore not every cognition need be a judgment. In doing so, he adopts the mistaken view of “immediate self-evidence” which we seek to refute here. He says that perception is “immediate knowledge” (op. cit., p. 599).
This is what B. Erdmann does in his fine monograph Erkennen und Verstehen, Sitzungsberichte der königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaft 53, p. 1251, where he invariably uses the expression ‘perceiving knowledge’ in the one acceptable sense explained above.
Abhandlungen der Friesschen Schule, II, p. 444.
S. Jevons, The Principle of Science, 1874.
Vorlesungen über Mechanik, 4th edition, 1897, p. 1.
Avenarius too understood by “simplest” description the one that employs the smallest possible number of concepts. See F. Raab, Die Philosophie des Avenarius, 1912, p. 146.
Avenarius too understood by “simplest” description the one that employs the smallest possible number of concepts. See F. Raab, Die Philosophie des Avenarius, 1912, p. v.
Avenarius too understood by “simplest” description the one that employs the smallest possible number of concepts. See F. Raab, Die Philosophie des Avenarius, 1912, p. v.
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Schlick, M. (1974). What Knowledge is Not. In: General Theory of Knowledge. LEP Library of Exact Philosophy, vol 11. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_12
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