Advertisement

What Knowledge is Not

  • Moritz Schlick
Part of the LEP Library of Exact Philosophy book series (LEP, volume 11)

Abstract

Anyone who looks at the findings obtained thus far concerning the nature of knowledge will perhaps fall prey to a certain feeling of disappointment22. Is knowledge nothing more than a mere designating? If so, does the human mind not remain forever a stranger to and remote from the things, processes and relations it wishes to know? Can it never effect a more intimate union with the objects of this world, of which it too is a member?

Keywords

Exact Science Perceptual Knowledge Elementary Concept Intuitive Knowledge Intuitive Representation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 22.
    A typical expression of this appears in the following words from a review of the first edition of this book: “It is incomprehensible to this reviewer how anyone who has ever struggled to obtain an insight can be satisfied with this point of view” (Jahrbücher über die Fortschritte der Mathematik, 1923).Google Scholar
  2. 23.
    In connection with what follows, see my article “Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis?”, Viertel Jahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie 37 (1913), pp. 472–488.Google Scholar
  3. 24.
    H. Bergson, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Jena 1901, p. 26.Google Scholar
  4. 25.
    E. Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, Logos I, (1910/11), p. 341.Google Scholar
  5. 26.
    Among these I cite A. Riehl, who contrasts immediate acquaintance with understanding (Der philosophische Kritizismus, II, i, p. 221), and B. Russell, who distinguishes quite correctly between “knowledge of things” (Kennen) and “knowledge of truths” (Erkennen). For this, see The Problems of Philosophy, p. 69. Also see E. von Aster, Prinzipien der Erkenntnislehre, 1913, pp. 6 ff.Google Scholar
  6. 27.
    F. Paulsen in P. Hinneberg’s volume Systematische Philosophie, 1907, p. 397.Google Scholar
  7. 28.
    The same truth lies at the base of the somewhat involved comment that Kant makes on the Cartesian thesis, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kehrbach edition, p. 696.Google Scholar
  8. 29.
    F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 185.Google Scholar
  9. 30.
    F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 181.Google Scholar
  10. 31.
    F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 188.Google Scholar
  11. 32.
    F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874, p. 277.Google Scholar
  12. 33.
    L. Nelson draws the opposite conclusion (Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie, Abhandlungen der Friesschen Schule, III, 1912, p. 598). He argues that since a perception is knowledge but is not a judgment, therefore not every cognition need be a judgment. In doing so, he adopts the mistaken view of “immediate self-evidence” which we seek to refute here. He says that perception is “immediate knowledge” (op. cit., p. 599).Google Scholar
  13. 34.
    This is what B. Erdmann does in his fine monograph Erkennen und Verstehen, Sitzungsberichte der königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaft 53, p. 1251, where he invariably uses the expression ‘perceiving knowledge’ in the one acceptable sense explained above.Google Scholar
  14. 35.
    Abhandlungen der Friesschen Schule, II, p. 444.Google Scholar
  15. 36.
    S. Jevons, The Principle of Science, 1874.Google Scholar
  16. 37.
    Vorlesungen über Mechanik, 4th edition, 1897, p. 1.Google Scholar
  17. 38.
    Avenarius too understood by “simplest” description the one that employs the smallest possible number of concepts. See F. Raab, Die Philosophie des Avenarius, 1912, p. 146.Google Scholar
  18. 39.
    Avenarius too understood by “simplest” description the one that employs the smallest possible number of concepts. See F. Raab, Die Philosophie des Avenarius, 1912, p. v.Google Scholar
  19. 40.
    Avenarius too understood by “simplest” description the one that employs the smallest possible number of concepts. See F. Raab, Die Philosophie des Avenarius, 1912, p. v.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag/Wien 1974

Authors and Affiliations

  • Moritz Schlick

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations