Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
As discussed in Section 1.3, two-person zero-sum games constitute an important class of Nash equilibrium games. Differential games of this class have been extensively treated, for instance in Refs. 5.1–5.4; here we shall only give those results which arise directly from specializing the N-person nonzero-sum case.
KeywordsCollective Bargaining Differential Game Admissible Strategy Strategy Pair Total Wage
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References for Chapter 5
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