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Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Differential Games

  • G. Leitmann
Part of the International Centre for Mechanical Sciences book series (CISM, volume 211)

Abstract

Many player differential games are discussed for a cooperative mood of play in the sense of Pareto, and for a non-cooperative one, in the sense of Nash. In the cooperative case, the results are equally applicable to the situation of a single decision-maker with multi-criteria. Necessary as well as sufficient conditions for optimal play are considered. Some examples are presented to illustrate the theory.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Optimization Theory Cooperative Game Differential Game Domination Structure 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Wien 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • G. Leitmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mechanical EngineeringUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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