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Juhos’ Antiphysicalism and his Views on the Psychophysical Problem

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Der Wiener Kreis in Ungarn / The Vienna Circle in Hungary

Part of the book series: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis ((WIENER KREIS,volume 16))

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Abstract

In this paper my primary aim is to discuss Bela Juhos’ views on the mind-body problem (or the psychophysical problem, as the logical positivists preferred to call it). In order to achieve this, I find it necessary to provide some background against which his ideas can be located: I shall outline Juhos’ metaphilosophical views on the nature and goal of philosophical inquiry, and the diverse accounts of the psychophysical problem in and around the Vienna Circle.

He came from a (possibly Transsylvanian) gentry family, who had a steel business at the turn of the 20th century both in Budapest and Vienna. Bela Juhos himself was born in Budapest and moved to Vienna in 1909, at the age of 8. Besides Juhos, the psychologist Egon Brunswik, who was associated with the Vienna Circle, also came from a (historical) Hungarian family. However, the branch of Brunswiks he belonged to, had lived in Vienna for long, so his relations to Hungary may have been rather weak. (This information is credited to Csaba Pléh.)

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References

  1. Cf. e.g. Béla Juhos, Die Erkenntnis und ihre Leistung. Wien: Springer 1950, pp. 1–2.

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  2. “Kritische Bemerkungen zur Wissenschaftstheorie des Physikalismus”, in: Erkenntnis 4, 1934, pp. 397–418., “Empiricism and Physicalism”, in: Analysis 2/6, 1935, pp. 81–92., “Some Modes of Speech of Empirical Science”, in Analysis 3/5, 1936, pp. 41–55. All reprinted in Bela Juhos, Selected Papers on Epistemology and Physics. Dordrecht-Boston: D. Reidel 1976.

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  3. This book was Juhos’ Habilitationsschrift, which he submitted to the University of Vienna in 1948.

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  4. Already early in his career, as e.g. in “Stufen der Kausalität”, in: Jahresbericht der Philosophischen Gesellschaft zu Wien 1931/32, pp. 1–19., and also later, e.g. in “Wie gewinnen wir Naturgesetze?” in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 22/4, 1968, pp. 534–548.

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  5. (together with Hubert Schleichert) Die erkenntnislogischen Grundlagen der Klassischen Physik. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1963, Die erkenntnislogischen Grundlagen der Modernen Physik. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1967.

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  6. “Die methodologische Symmetrie von Verifikation und Falsifikation” in: Journal for General Theory of Science 1/2, 1970, pp. 41–70.

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  7. See e.g. “The Influence of Epistemological Analysis on Scientific Research: Length and Time in the Special Theory of Relativity”. In: Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1968.

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  9. Neurath, Carnap, Popper and Morris advocated “hypothetism” from the early 1930s.

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  10. There were, of course, adversaries of parallelism as well. Critics from the tradition of Lebensphilosophie included Dilthey and Husserl, but James was also a firm opponent. See Michael Heidelberger, “The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism”, in: Paolo Parrini, Wesley C. Salmon, and Merrilee H. Salmon (eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press 2003, pp. 258–259.

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  11. There were some others as well, see e.g. Kaufmann’s view in Felix Kaufmann, Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften. Wien: Springer 1936.

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  12. Gustav Bergmann writes: “as long as one sticks to cautious generalities all Logical Positivists could still agree that they (a) hold Humean views on causality and induction [...]”. (in: “Logical Positivism”, in: Vergilius Ferm (ed.), A History of Philosophical Systems. New York: Philosophical Library 1951, pp. 471–482. Reprinted in: Gustav Bergmann, The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishers 1954, p. 2.

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  13. For example, Carnap, still in 1963, considered it only as a hypothesis, not sufficiently grounded as yet (see his “Intellectual Autobiography”, in: Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle: Open Court 1963, pp. 1–84., and “Reply to Feigl”, ibid. pp. 859–60.); Neurath definitely rejected it.

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  14. For a detailed history, see Thomas E. Uebel, Overcoming Logical Positivism from Within. Neurath in the Vienna Circle’s Protocol Sentence Debate. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi 1992. Focusing on Wittgenstein’s claims to priority and the “plagiarism issue” with Carnap, see Jaakko Hintikka, “Ludwig’s Apple Tree: On the Philosophical Relations between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle”, In: Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Scientific Philosophy: Origins and Developments. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1993, pp. 27–46.

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  15. Put forward by Neurath and also by Neider. Cf. e.g., Uebel, op. cit. pp. 93–96.

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  16. See e.g., Uebel, op. cit.

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  17. See Rudolf Carnap, “Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache”, in: Erkenntnis 3, 1932/33, pp. 107–142.

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  18. Rudolf Carnap, “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft”, in: Erkenntnis 2, 1932, pp. 432–465.

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  19. See Karl Duncker, “Behaviorismus und Gestaltpsychologie. Kritische Bemerkungen zu Carnap’s ‘Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache’”, in: Erkenntnis 3, 1932/33, pp. 162–176., and Edgar Zilsel, “Bemerkungen zur Wissenschaftslogik”, in: Erkenntnis 3, 1932/33, pp. 143–161.

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  20. Otto Neurath, “Radikaler Physikalismus und ‘wirkliche Welt’”, in: Erkenntnis 4, 1934, pp. 346–362. Moritz Schlick, “Über das Fundament der Erkenntnis”, in: Erkenntnis 4, 1934, pp. 79–99.; “Facts and Propositions” in: Analysis 2, 1935a, pp. 65–70.; “Sur les ‘Constatations’”, in: Sur le fondement de la connaissance (Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles, No. 289.). Paris: Herman et Cie 1935b. English transl.: “On Affirmations”, in: Henk L. Mulder, Barbara F. B. van de Velde-Schlick (eds.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II, 1925–1936, Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel 1979, pp. 407–413. Carl G. Hempel, “On the Logical Positivists’ Theory of Truth”, Analysis 2, 1935, pp. 49–59.; “Some Remarks on ‘Facts and Propositions’”, Analysis 2, 1935, pp. 93–96.; “Some Remarks on Empiricism”, Analysis 3, 1936, pp. 33–40. For the publication data of Juhos’ papers, see note 3.

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  21. Cf. Schlick 1934, Schlick 1935a, Schlick 1935b, and “De la relation entre les notions psychologiques et les notions physiques”, in: Revue de la Synthese 10, 1935, pp. 5–26. English transl.: “On the Relation between Psychological and Physical Concepts”, in: Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (eds.), Readings in the Philosophical Analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1949.

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  22. De la relation entre les notions psychologiques et les notions physiques”, in: Revue de la Synthese 10, 1935, pp. 5–26 Ibid.

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  23. De la relation entre les notions psychologiques et les notions physiques”, in: Revue de la Synthese 10, 1935, pp. 5–26 Ibid.

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  24. An important difference being that Feigl’s view was emphatically a metaphysical view. See Schlick, “De la relation entre les notions psychologiques et les notions physiques”; Herbert Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”, in: Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven and Grover Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1958, pp. 370–497., and “Mind-Body, not a Pseudo-Problem”, in: Sydney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York: New York University Press 1960, pp. 24–36.

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  25. Jack J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, in: The Philosophical Review, 1959/2, pp. 141–156.

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  26. Herbert Feigl, “The Mind-Body Problem in the Development of Logical Empiricism”, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950, pp. 64–83.

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  27. Cf. Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Berlin: Springer, 1918. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 1927, and Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits. London: Allen and Unwin 1948. Feigl also drew attention to the similarities between these Russellian and Schlickian views; see his “Russell and Schlick: A Remarkable Agreement on a Monistic Solution of the Mind-Body Problem”, in: Erkenntnis 9, 1975, pp. 11–34. However, there are other grave problems for such views, which I cannot discuss here.

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  28. See Juhos, “Empiricism and Physicalism” p. 85.

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  29. See Hempel, “Some Remarks on Empiricism”, p. 36.

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  30. Cf. Juhos, “Some Modes of Speech of Empirical Science”, p. 68.

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  31. Kurt Baier, “Pains”, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40, 1962, pp. 1–23, and “Smart on Sensations” in: Clive Vernon Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. London: Macmillan 1970, pp. 95–106.

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  32. Cf. Smart: “Brain Processes and Incorrigibility”, in: Clive Vernon Borst (ed.) The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. London: Macmillan 1970, pp. 107–109.

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  33. Ibid.

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  34. Ibid.

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  35. See Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, in: Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1956, pp. 253–329.

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  36. Here I follow Chalmers’ brief reconstruction of Sellars’ argument, see David Chalmers, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”, in: Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, pp. 220–272.

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  37. Chalmers Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, pp. 220–272 ibid.

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  38. See Lawrence BonJour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”, in: American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 1978, pp. 1–13.; Donald Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, in: Ernest Lepore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell 1986, pp. 307–19.; John McDowell, Mind and World. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 1994.

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  39. Chalmers Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, pp. 220–272 op. cit.

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  40. Richard Rorty, “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories”, in: The Review of Metaphysics 19, 1965, pp. 24–54.

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  41. It must be noted, however, that this argument was principally taken over from Schlick. See Schlick, “De la relation entre les notions psychologiques et les notions physiques”, and “Meaning and Verification”, in: The Philosophical Review 44, 1936, pp. 339–369. Kraft, in his official evaluation of Juhos’ Habilitationsschrift (which appeared later as Die Erkenntnis und ihre Leistung) even criticized Juhos for not mentioning that this argument is credited to Schlick. In the book version, however, Juhos does refer to Schlick, saying that he provided a very similar argument.

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  42. Cf. Schlick “De la relation entre les notions psychologiques et les notions physiques” and also Virgil C. Aldrich, “Messrs. Schlick and Ayer on Immortality”, in: The Philosophical Review 47, 1938, pp. 209–213.

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Authors
  1. Gergely Ambrus
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Logic, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Ungarn

    András Máté

  2. London School of Economics, London, UK

    Miklós Rédei

  3. Institut Wiener Kreis, Universität Wien, Wien, Österreich

    Friedrich Stadler

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Ambrus, G. (2011). Juhos’ Antiphysicalism and his Views on the Psychophysical Problem. In: Máté, A., Rédei, M., Stadler, F. (eds) Der Wiener Kreis in Ungarn / The Vienna Circle in Hungary. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis, vol 16. Springer, Vienna. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-0177-3_5

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