Abstract
Max Weber’s study of law would long have been forgotten were it nothing more than the eclectic treatment of a few main problems, as is to be found in his Sociology of Law in ‘Wirtschaft and Gesellschaf’ (Economy and Society).1 The distinctions between public and private, subjective and objective law, to mention but a few of the topics, do not exceed anything, which was not already prevalent in the juridical legal theory of Weber’s day. Moreover the very core of his sociology of law — the description of the development of law as a rationalizing process — suffers from the lack of historicity of Weber’s conceptual framework to such an extent, that it is difficult to make the embodied insight profitable for the consciousness of today. If Weber’s study of law is still of interest, then for the same reasons that his treatment of other diverse scientific fields — especially his methodology or his political sociology — still command an audience. Weber knew, as no other sociological thinker of his day, how to expose effectively the logical premises of his thinking in the different fields he treated. He intentionally formed the objects of his study in accordance with the premises of his logic. It is exactly this, the consumate reflection of his thinking, which has assured him attention, even in posterity.
The following article is taken from a more comprehensive study of the “Strukturwandel der Legitimation”, Freiburg 1976, which is soon to be published. For the purpose of a separate publication this article has been revised.
If, in the following descourse, I have managed to make myself at least somewhat clear, then the credit must go entirely to Julia Ballot who has translated the text into English.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
It is questionable what else is to be considered as within the scope of Weber’s sociology of law. Cf. J. Winckelmann, Max Webers Rechtssoziologie, in: Webers Rechtssoziologie, Neuwied 1960, p. 15 seq.; Max Rheinstein (Ed.), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, Cambridge (Mass.) 3/1969.
S. Carl Mayer, Die Marx-Interpretation von Max Weber, Soziale Welt 1974, p. 265 seq.
Cf. my article: Gegenstand und Methode, in: Sachlichkeit, Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von H. Plessner, Cologne 1973, p. 187 seq.
Max Weber, Die „Objektivität“ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (WL) Tübingen 3/1968, p. 154. I do not share the opinion of Henrich that Weber had separated the methodology of science from the epistemological context. D. Henrich, Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 15, 35. 5 M. Weber, Die ”Objektivität“, WL p. 181.
M. Weber, Die “Objektivität”, WL p. 175 seq.
D. Henrich, Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 14, 19.
M. Weber, R. Stammlers “Überwindung”, WL, pp. 357, 330.
D. Henrich, Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre, p. 12.
Cf. Leo Strauss, Naturrecht und Geschichte, p. 79 seq.
Weber is hereby for the most part in keeping with H. Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, pp. 32 seq., 54 passim.
M. Weber, Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie, WL p. 1 seq. (107).
Cf. P. Winch, Die Idee der Sozialwissenschaft, Frankfurt 1966, p. 148 seq.
M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Cologne 1964, 1, 1, 1, p. 3.
M. Weber, R. Stammlers “Überwindung” der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, WL, p. 329.
M. Weber, R. Stammlers “Überwindung”, WL, p. 339.
M. Weber, Nachtrag zu dem Aufsatz über R. Stammlers “Überwindung” der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, WL, p. 381. It is incomprehensible how one can overlook this crucial content of the Neokantian theory and reduce this to the simple differentiation between the being and the ought, as is to be found in the everyday comprehension of these concepts. This is, however, the intent of R. Hauser, Norm, Recht und Staat, p. 160. It does not occur to anyone to contest the mere differentiation between the being and the ought. One can, therefore, claim that this differentiation is reflected in the empirical reality. If one, however, states the same of that antagonism which the Neokantians and above all Weber and Kelsen meant, then one is simply making oneself epistemologically ignorant.
G. Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft (892/93), Stuttgart 1904, p. 12 seq.
H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Vienna 2/1960, p. 5.
This common inference is also to be found by G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, Stuttgart 6/1956, p. 100.
The same doubt in the evidence of the postulates arises if one tries to ascertain what is meant by something “follows” from something else. One cannot contest that it is meaningful to claim that: From a certain situation there follows a certain consequence for someone. This can be said even of a purely natural event. Thus the consequence of a thunderstorm for someone can be that he forbears an urgent purchase. One may object that it is not meant in this sense. For, in this case the consequence is entirely at the will of the person concerned. But how is it when someone takes the consequences of a social situation, for instance, when a pupil leaves school after the discussion of his grades?
Weber explains: herein “lies the differentiation between the empirical sciences of action: of sociology and history in comparison to all dogmatic, jurisprudence, logic, ethic and aesthetic, which wish to analyse the ‘correct’, ‘valid’ meaning of their objects.” Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 1, 1, 1, p. 4.
M. Weber, R. Stammhers “Überwindung”, WL, p. 334; Cf. also Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 1, 1, 1, p. 4.
M. Weber, R. Stammlers “Überwindung”, WL, p. 347.
M. Weber, R. Stammhers “Überwindung”, WL, p. 346.
M. Weber, R. Stammhers “Überwindung”, WL, p. 350 seq.
M. Weber, R. Stammhers “Überwindung”, WL, p. 348.
F. Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, Göttingen 1952, p. 341 seq.
M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1, 1, 5, p. 22 seq.
This relationship is quite similar to that between law and ethic; cf. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1, 1, 1, 6, p. 26.
M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1, 1, 7, p. 26.
Obviously values mean something else for Weber than they do for Rickert. Rickert claimed an universal validity of norms which, in the last instance, binds everyone. H. Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, Tübingen 1928, p. 132 seq. It has often been stated that in this point Weber did not follow Rickert. S. J. J. Schaaf, Geschichte und Begriff, Tübingen 1946, p. 59.
M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, Ges. Aufsätze z. Relig. Soz. Bd. I, pp. 11, 35, 61 seq.
M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 2, 5, 1, p. 317 seq.
Idem 2, 7, 3, p. 564 seq.
Weber summarized the stages of the development of law in the following manner: “From this perspective, the formal qualities of the law emerge as follows: arising in primitive legal procedure from a combination of magically conditioned formalism and irrationality conditioned by revelation, they proceed to increasingly specialized juridical and logical rationality and systematization, passing through a stage of theoretically or patrimonially conditioned substantive and informal expediency. Finally, they assume, at least from an external viewpoint, an increasingly logical sublimation and deductive rigor and develop an increasingly rational technique in procedure. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2, 7, 8, p. 645. (Translation from M. Rheinstein, 1.c. pp. 303, 304.)
Idem 2, 7, 2, p. 563. According to this, the process of rationalisation had not freed man, it had only replaced the constraints, to which man used to be subjected to, by new ones. Since he has escaped the subjective powers, he is now subjected to the tragical conflict of having indeed received the power of disposition, but of no longer being able to do anything with this power. He is pushed aside into a purely private sphere, where he can try to compensate the constraint of rationalization with mere intellectualization. Cf. Wissenschaft als Beruf, WL, p. 612.
Cf. for instance Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 2, 7, 2, pp. 562, 602.
Christian von Ferber points this out. Die Gewalt in der Politik, Stuttgart 1970, p. 81.
Cf. the interesting, if intellectually somewhat nebulous modell of G. A. Almond: Politische Systeme und politischer Wandel, in: W. Zapf (Ed.), Theorien des sozialen Wandels, Cologne 1969, p. 211 seq.
Cf. especially Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 2, 7, 8, p. 644 seq.
M. Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf, WL, p. 605.
W. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890–1920, Tübingen 1959; idem, Zum Begriff der “plebiszitären Führerdemokratie” bei Max Weber, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 15 (2) 1963, p. 295 seq.
K. Löwenstein, Max Weber als “Ahnherr” des plebiszitären Führerstaats, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 13, 1961, p. 258 seq.
It is consistent in these circumstances to dispense absolution if such confessions can somehow or other still be proved. Cf. for instance Fritz Loos, Zur Wert-und Rechtslehre Max Webers, Tübingen 1970, p. 111 seq.
Max Weber, Der Reichspräsident, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, Tübingen 1958, p. 486 seq. (487).
A brilliant analysis of the process is to be found in H. Plessner, Die verspätete Nation, Stuttgart 4/1959. Plessner emphasizes that the devaluation of the claim of consciousness to objectivity always occurs on the background of the elevation of some other being, before which consciousness gives way.
E. Cassirer, has already given us an extensive critique. E. Cassirer, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, Darmstadt 1969.
For this ingenious concept see H. Plessner, Der kategorische Konjunktiv, in: Verstehen und Vertrauen, Festschrift für Friedrich Bollnow zum 65. Geburtstag, Stuttgart 1968.
Max Weber, Die “Objektivität” sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, in: WL p. 152.
In his inaugural lecture in Freiburg, Weber attempted to substantiate his option for a decisive national-state oriented political economy against all possible critique, even by reference to the “physical and psychological qualities of race”. But here he already entertained doubts as to social Darwinism. M. Weber, Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, in: Ges. Politische Schriften, p. 1 seq. (4 seq.) E. Nolte goes as far as viewing the inaugural lecture in Freiburg as one of the most important impulses for Hitler’s “Mein Kampf”. At the same time, however, he also emphasizes the differences. E. Nolte, Max Weber vor dem Faschismus, in: Der Staat, 2, 1963, p. 1 seq.
D. Henrich, Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre, p. 3.
Idem, p. 123.
Henrich also sees himself compelled to recognize this; idem p. 129.
C. B. Macpherson, Die Politische Theorie des Besitzindividualismus (1962) Frankfurt 1967, p. 21 seq.
Cf. Marianne Weber, Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild. Tübingen 1926, p. 642 seq.
Max Weber, R. Stammlers “Überwindung” der Materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, WL, p. 328 seq.
The categorial validity of this statement is to be found not only by Kelsen but also by G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, Stuttgart 5/1956, p. 100.
Cf. with the following H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Vienna 2/1960, especially p. 196 seq.
Idem p. 205.
Thus E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man, Cambridge (Mass.) 1964, p. 6.
C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, München 2/1934, p. 30.
H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, p. 224.
A short summary is to be found in K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, Berlin 1960, p. 68 seq.
G. Winkler, Wertbetrachtung im Recht und ihre Grenzen, Vienna 1969, p. 12.
A. Kaufmann, die ontologische Struktur des Rechts, p. 506. R. Marcic, Um eine Grundlegung des Rechts, p. 514.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1976 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dux, G. (1976). Believing — Evaluating — Knowing Logic and Legitimation in Max Weber’s Study of Law. In: Dux, G., Luckmann, T. (eds) Contributions to the Sociology of Knowledge / Contributions to the Sociology of Religion. Internationales Jahrbuch für Wissens- und Religionssoziologie / International Yearbook for Sociology of Knowledge and Religion, vol 10. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-14483-0_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-14483-0_2
Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-531-11355-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-663-14483-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive