Abstract
Federalism seems to be a prime candidate for constitutional politics. On the one hand it can be regarded as a constitutional principle; on the other hand it is also a social instrument, a tool to resolve conflict in society and to create consensus for the constitutional framework. In other words, federalism both expresses and sustains the constitutional consensus of a given society. One is tempted to assume that it should not be difficult to list the federal states and then to go on and evaluate the role of constitution-making for federalism.
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Sturm, R. (2000). Federalism and Constitutional Politics: A Theoretical Perspective. In: Schultze, RO., Sturm, R. (eds) The Politics of Constitutional Reform in North America. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-11628-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-11628-8_5
Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden
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