“Psychology” or “The Psychological Studies”?

Abstract

Although I have long focused on the ubiquitous evidences of increasing differentiation and fractionation within psychology (e. g. Koch 1959; 1961; 1964; 1965; 1969a;b; 1971; 1973; 1976; 1985; 1992a-d), I do not think that recognition of this leads to some ultimate relativism. Differing frameworks, perspectives, hypotheses, or theories bearing on the same domain are in no necessary way equally plausible, illuminating, insightful, salient, or true. The “logic of confirmation” as dictated to the world by philosophers of science during much of this century is not well suited to the discrimination of such characters of a formulation as are suggested by terms like plausible or insightful — or, indeed, true. I have tried to explore more fruitful modes of assessment. Moreover, although perspectivity is ineliminable, one can certainly hope the future will bring more revealing and broader perspectives than many of the rather arbitrary and dismal ones that have constrained vision throughout the past century. We can hope, too, for more flexibility in the capacity of inquirers to enrich their vision by trying on the spectacles of their neighbors.

On both historical and principled grounds, the author has long argued that psychology cannot be a single or coherent discipline — whether conceived in scientific or sui generis terms. Instead, the desirability of renaming psychology as the psychological studies has been urged. The present article is a synoptic review of the basis for such a position and its entailments for the future. These are seen to be rather inviting ones for all competent persons engaged in psychological inquiry.