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Designing the Mode of Entry

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Abstract

As explained before1, the choice of basic entry mode is just one step in the market entry process. The specific and further design of the chosen institutional form of market entry is at least equally important to ensure that the market is served most adequately. The graph below summarizes the theoretical findings on market entry mode as discussed in Chapter 2 and serves as guidance for the analysis.

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References

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© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 1999

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