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Virtuelle Unternehmen aus spieltheoretischer Sicht

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Virtuelle Unternehmen

Part of the book series: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft ((ZFB,volume 2))

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Produktionswirtschaft, Fakultat für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D-44780, Bochum, Deutschland

    Professor Dr. Marion Steven (Lehrstuhl)

Authors
  1. Professor Dr. Marion Steven
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  2. Dipl.-Ök. Lars Otterpohl
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Editor information

Horst Albach Dieter Specht Horst Wildemann

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© 2000 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Steven, M., Otterpohl, L. (2000). Virtuelle Unternehmen aus spieltheoretischer Sicht. In: Albach, H., Specht, D., Wildemann, H. (eds) Virtuelle Unternehmen. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, vol 2. Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-05971-4_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-05971-4_10

  • Publisher Name: Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-409-11628-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-663-05971-4

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