Summary

Summary

Starting from an aphorismus of Nietzsche, which calls in question the ability of modern man to celebrate a feast, the author inquires into the elements of the general concepts “feast” and “festival” and into their human prerequisites. This leads to the thesis that the celebration of a feast which by definition is a day of joy, is possible only as far as man is at one with himself and with the world as a whole i. e. as far as he is able to say: everything that is, is good, and it is good to be. To celebrate a feast does not even mean anything but the performance of that agreement with the world as a whole — at a special occasion, that is, and in an uncommon manner. Next step: the highest possible and even the highest thinkable degree of that agreement with the world as a whole is realized in the cultic praise of divine worship which therefore by the very same reason is the most festive form of a feast which can be tought of. This does not mean, however, that there are exclusively religious feasts, but it does mean, that there is no such a thing as a merely secular feast; there is no such thing as a feast without Gods. The question arises: what about the celebration of a feast within a consistently secularized society? The answer is given by way of an analysis of the artificial feasts, founded by the political power in order to oust the traditional religious feasts — especially by a description of the feasts of the French Revolution and of the “First of May” in the totalitarian regimes. In conclusion the author shows the dangerous neighbourhood of the artificial feast to the “anti-feast” i. e. the nihilistic destruction, celebrated like a feast.