Skip to main content

The Strategic Importance of Relations between Turkey and the European Community

  • Chapter
Turkey and the European Community

Part of the book series: Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts ((ORIENT))

  • 74 Accesses

Abstract

An analysis of the strategic relevance of relations between Turkey and the European Community presents special methodological and substantive difficulties.

This analysis, presented to the study Group, was published earlier in International Spectator 18 (nos. 1-2, 1983), pp. 47-61.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. In that period the Soviet Mediterranean fleet consisted of 53 units, the highest number since 1977.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Cf. Maurizio Cremasco and Stefano Silvesti, II Fianco Sud della Nato (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1980), p. 81

    Google Scholar 

  3. The text of the Montreux Convention is reproduced in Appendix B of the book by Jesse W. Lewis, The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).

    Google Scholar 

  4. The exact size of the Soviet navy when the hostilities broke out has not been officially made public. For an estimate cf. R.G. Weinland, Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War: A Case Study (Washington: Washington Paper No. 61, 1979) p. 76.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Cf. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch. A Memoir (New York: 1976), p. 447.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Cf. Duygu B. Sezer, Turkey’s Security Policies (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 164, 1981), p. 15.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, 95th Congress. 27 March 1977 (Washington: USGPO, 1977).

    Google Scholar 

  8. Cf. The Military Balance 1982 - 1983 (London: IISS, 1982), p. 15.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Sir Bernard Burrows, “The security dimension for Western Europe”, paper Presented at the TEPSA/IEP Conference on Turkey and the Community, Bonn, 28 - 29 November 1980, p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  10. The category 3 divisions are at a quarter of their full war strengh in terms of personnel, possibly com-plete with fighting vehicles (some obsolescent). Cf. The Military Balance 1982 - 1983, p. 15.

    Google Scholar 

  11. The deployment of forces in these military districts is as follows: Kiev, 11 divisions (6 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 artillery); Moscow, 7 divisions (2 tank, 4 motor rifle, 1 airborne); Volga, 3 motor rifle divi-sions; Turkestan, 6 divisions (5 motor rifle, 1 artillery).

    Google Scholar 

  12. Cf. The Military Balance 1982 - 1983, p. 20.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Cf. International Herald Tribune, 29 November, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  14. All data on the Turkish armed forces is from The Military Balance 1982 - 83, cit., p. 44.

    Google Scholar 

  15. For the financial data and a complete list of the planned purchases, cf. Senate Delegation Report, Per-spectives on NATO’s Southern Flank, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 3 - 13 April 1980 (Washington: USGPO, 1980), p. 16.

    Google Scholar 

  16. For the fiscal year 1981, the U.S. Congress approved 250 million dollars for the Foreign Military Sales Program and 200 million for the economic aid program and about 2 million for the International Mili-tary Education and Training (IME) program. For fiscal year 1982, the United States increased its aid to 700 million dollars (300 million in economic aid and 400 in military aid). Of the 400 million in mili-tary aid, 250 were provided at low interests rates. In addition, the aid for the IMET program was to be increased form 1.6 to 3.5 million dollars. Cf. International Communication Agency, Daily Wireless File, No. 53, 18 March 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  17. In the course of 1982 the Iraqi pipeline through Syria was frequently sabotaged. On Iraqi oil output, cf. Financial Times 4 January 1982, p. 1; 8 January 1982, p. 14; 1 June 1982, p. 3; and 3 December 1982, p. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  18. On the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean, cf. Andrew Mison, The Aegean Dispute (London: IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 155, 1980).

    Google Scholar 

  19. Greece’s insistence and the impossibility of finding a compromise formula prevented the formulation and issue of a final communique for the first time in the Alliance’s history.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Cf. Der Spiegel, 4 February 1980, pp. 33 - 34.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Ahmet Evin Geoffrey Denton

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1990 Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, Opladen

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Cremasco, M. (1990). The Strategic Importance of Relations between Turkey and the European Community. In: Evin, A., Denton, G. (eds) Turkey and the European Community. Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-01422-5_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-01422-5_8

  • Publisher Name: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-8100-0646-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-663-01422-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics